Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need For a Tolerant First Amendment by Griffin, Leslie C.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 62 Number 1 Article 3 
January 2010 
Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need For a Tolerant First 
Amendment 
Leslie C. Griffin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need For a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 Me. L. 
Rev. 23 (2010). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
FIGHTING THE NEW WARS OF RELIGION: THE 
NEED FOR A TOLERANT FIRST AMENDMENT  
Leslie C. Griffin 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF TOLERANCE  
 A. The Wars of Religious Intolerance 
 B. From Religious Intolerance to Philosophical Intolerance  
 C. From Philosophical Intolerance to Constitutional Intolerance 
 D. Understanding Contemporary Intolerance 
III. RELIGIOUS TRUTH MUST NOT BE ENFORCED BY LAW 
 A. Religious Debate over Proposition 8 
 B. How Tolerance Differs from the Religious Approach to Gay Marriage 
 C. Free Exercise Does Not Justify Intolerance  
IV. TOLERANCE PROTECTS INDIVIDUALS AGAINST THE POWER OF BOTH 
CHURCH AND STATE 
 A. Church Autonomy 
  1. Torts  
  2. Property 
  3. Employment  
 B. Government Funding of Religion 
V. TOLERANCE ACCEPTS THE NEW DIVERSITY 
VI. CONCLUSION  
24 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
FIGHTING THE NEW WARS OF RELIGION: THE 
NEED FOR A TOLERANT FIRST AMENDMENT  
Leslie C. Griffin* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Religious wars have broken out around the country about the legality of gay 
marriage, the consequences of gay ordination for property ownership, the funding 
of faith-based organizations and the placement of crosses and Ten Commandments 
(but not Seven Aphorisms) on public land.  To resolve such impassioned disputes, 
Americans traditionally look to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 
which state “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1  Unfortunately, the Court’s modern 
decisions interpreting those clauses have shed more heat than light on the 
discussion and have provoked ongoing controversy instead of any settled resolution 
of the issues.  In modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, for example, the 
Court for many years identified “separation of church and state” as its guiding 
principle and frequently applied “strict scrutiny” to laws that burdened the right of 
Free Exercise.2  Over time, however, dissatisfaction erupted with separationism’s 
perceived hostility to religion, and the Court sought more neutral approaches to the 
Religion Clauses.  On the establishment side, it gradually allowed more funding of 
religion, most notably permitting parents of religious schoolchildren to use 
vouchers and upholding aid that was neutrally given to religious and non-religious 
schools alike.3  The Court also adopted a more neutral theory of the Free Exercise 
Clause, holding in the controversial 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith 
that, because all citizens are subject to “neutral laws of general applicability” and 
no citizen is above the law, strict scrutiny does not apply to laws that 
unintentionally burden free exercise.4  Meanwhile, as long as Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor remained on the Court, the test for public displays such as the Ten 
Commandments and for government religious speech and prayer was whether a 
reasonable observer would conclude that the government was endorsing religion in 
its actions.5  
Although the new neutral Establishment Clause decisions have been politically 
popular for directing government resources to religious citizens, Smith and free 
exercise law have been less accepted.  In response to the lobbying of many 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor, Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center; 
B.A. University of Notre Dame, 1978; M.A., M. Phil., Ph.D. Yale University (Religious Studies), 1984; 
J. D. Stanford Law School, 1992.  I am grateful to Aaron Bruhl, Kang Chen, Kathleen Clark, Craig 
Conway, David Dow, Wade Haaland, Gerry Moohr, Nick Oweyssi and Ron Turner for their assistance 
in developing the ideas in this essay. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).  
 2. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 3. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).  
 4. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, 
J., concurring)).  
 5. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
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religious groups, Congress immediately rejected Smith, passing a Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),6 which initially applied to both the federal 
government and the states until the Supreme Court ruled that Congress lacked the 
power to apply RFRA to the states.7  RFRA still applies to the federal government.  
Thereafter Congress failed to pass the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA),8 
but succeeded with the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA),9 an unprecedented federal intervention into local zoning decisions.10  
The state and federal courts have also had a difficult time interpreting Smith, which 
the Supreme Court has not revisited since 1990, as well as the federal and state 
RFRAs that undermine Smith.  On the endorsement front, in 2005 the Justices split 
on the Ten Commandments cases, allowing a monument to remain on display on 
the Texas state capitol grounds while ordering the removal of a Ten 
Commandments display from a Kentucky courthouse.11 
With the Religion Clauses jurisprudence in a jumble and subject to varying 
degrees of political and popular support, it is no surprise that cases about public 
prayer and the Ten Commandments, property and religious freedom, continue to be 
filed, and that citizens dispute the appropriate role of religion in passing laws about 
gay marriage and funding faith-based organizations (FBOs).  The environment now 
mistakenly favors religion instead of religious liberty and fosters wars of religion 
instead of peaceful tolerance.  To reinvigorate the ideal of religious liberty, this 
Article advocates a return to the roots of the First Amendment in the principle of 
religious tolerance or toleration.12  I argue that the First Amendment is 
misinterpreted whenever its roots in tolerance are neglected, as they have been in 
the Court’s Religion Clauses cases as well as in contemporary politics. 
A focus on tolerance offers three important reminders about the appropriate 
role of religion in American democracy.  First, because toleration is a political and 
legal principle, toleration is skeptical about religious truth-claims and accordingly 
denies the state the power to enforce religious “truth” through force or law.  
Second, tolerance protects the individual against the power of both church and 
state.  Third, toleration must extend beyond the diversity among Christian sects of 
old Europe and the young United States and stretch in directions not anticipated by 
the Framers.  The United States is now the “world’s most religiously diverse 
nation.”13  As in the past, acceptance of diversity is more likely to begin with a 
principle of toleration rather than with alternative theories of respect for persons, 
equality, or liberty of conscience.  
In Part II, I describe the theory of tolerance that undergirds the First 
Amendment and sheds light on its interpretation in modern surroundings.  Part II-A 
                                                                                                     
 6. 42 U.S.C § 2000bb (2006). 
 7. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 8. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).  
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 10. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003).  
 11. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 12. Note: I use the words “tolerance” and “toleration” interchangeably throughout the Article.  
 13. DIANA ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” HAS BECOME THE 
WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION (2002).  
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examines toleration’s roots in St. Augustine’s belief that heretics could be 
compelled to faith and in the European Wars of Religion in the 16th and 17th 
centuries.  From the truce of the Wars of Religion arose the new philosophical 
principles of tolerance of Pierre Bayle and John Locke that are described in Part II-
B.  Locke influenced the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, who developed a 
government of constitutional tolerance, which is described in Part II-C.  Part II-D 
then employs the philosophy of John Rawls to develop a modern theory of 
constitutional tolerance that is based on legal and political rather than philosophical 
and religious principles.    
The subsequent parts of the Article illustrate the three claims about tolerance.  
In Part III, I explore the debate over gay marriage in order to argue that a tolerant 
theory of law and public culture requires legislators and citizens to base their votes 
on political not religious reasons.  Toleration’s first lesson, that religious truth 
should not be imposed by force of law, was repeatedly violated during the 
California campaign about Proposition 8, a voter initiative that banned gay 
marriage.14  
In Part IV, I identify several areas of the law where the courts currently protect 
religious organizations at the expense of individuals.  Part IV-A uses examples 
from tort, property, and employment law to demonstrate that many courts have 
forgotten that constitutional tolerance protects individuals from the powers of the 
church.  Part IV-B argues that a tolerant First Amendment does not allow the 
government to fund religious practice or employment discrimination within faith-
based organizations, but permits it to give some aid to religious organizations 
according to the same criteria met by nonreligious providers.  
In Part V, I use two monuments cases—Summum and Buono—to delineate a 
tolerant theory of public monuments that is more inclusive of minority religions 
like Summum and Buddhism than the current Establishment Clause tests.  The 
Summum religion, which was founded in Utah in 1975 and describes itself as a 
form of Gnostic Christianity, teaches that God originally gave Moses the Seven 
Aphorisms.15  The Supreme Court recently ruled against the Summum religion in 
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, in which Summum argued that a Utah city 
must place a Seven Aphorisms monument alongside the Ten Commandments in a 
public park.16  The Court has also granted certiorari in Salazar v. Buono in order to 
resolve a longstanding controversy about the presence of a Latin cross at a 
California veterans’ memorial,17 where the National Park Service once denied a 
request to build a “stupa” (a dome-shaped Buddhist shrine) alongside the cross.18  
A tolerant First Amendment imposes two requirements that the Court has ignored: 
first, it recognizes that crosses and the Ten Commandments retain their religious 
                                                                                                     
 14. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (upholding voter initiative banning gay marriage).  
 15. Summum.org, About Summum, http://www.summum.org/about.shtml; Summum and 
Freemasonry, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/freemasonry.shtml; The Teachings of the Summum 
are the Teachings of Gnostic Christianity, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/gnosticism.shtml (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2009). 
 16. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
 17. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 
1313 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009, No. 08-472).   
 18. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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character and are not secular; second, it allows such religious displays to stand only 
if they are surrounded by other religious monuments and symbols, e.g., the 
Summum Aphorisms, the Buddhist stupa, the Jewish Star of David, the Muslim 
crescent and star, or the Wiccan pentacle. 
In Part VI, I conclude that the current religious diversity of the United States is 
reminiscent of the days of the Framers of the Constitution, when the original states 
contained established churches from varying sects.  Although all those dominant 
churches were Christian, the Framers recognized that the states’ political union 
could not be based on Christian belief but required a principle of constitutional 
tolerance.  Today the nation is more diverse than the Framers could have 
envisioned.  The percentage of Christians in the population continues to decline 
and the “Nones”—non-theist and no-religion groups—show the largest net increase 
in numbers.19  In such circumstances, “[i]t is safer to trust the consequences of a 
right principle than reasonings in support of a bad one,” as James Madison 
suggested.20  Following Madison’s guidance, current First Amendment 
jurisprudence should abandon the current intolerant wars of religion and return to 
the principle of constitutional tolerance, which protects religious liberty instead of 
religion.  
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF TOLERANCE 
Tolerance contains the three components of objection, acceptance, and 
rejection: we object to something (or someone) because it is false or bad; we 
nonetheless accept it, not because it loses its negative qualities, but because other 
circumstances give us reason to accept or tolerate it; and at some stage, we reach 
the limits of tolerance and therefore reject the idea or person in question.21  
Considered in that way, judgments about toleration are complex, requiring 
individuals to weigh competing principles and values, as well as negative, always 
beginning with a sense of objection to something inferior.  “Toleration is always 
mere toleration.  It is less than equality just as it is distinct from liberty, and it is 
sharply at variance with fraternity.  For these reasons toleration is far from an ideal 
policy; it is contaminated, so to speak, by that very implication of evil which its 
meaning contains.”22 Because of tolerance’s negative connotations, it is frequently 
rejected as a political principle in favor of loftier ideals of equality, liberty, or 
respect.  James Madison rejected the negative-sounding tolerance in favor of free 
exercise when he drafted the Virginia Bill of Rights and the First Amendment.  
Nonetheless, I argue that the First Amendment is misinterpreted if its roots in 
tolerance are neglected.  Accordingly in this section I explain the modern history of 
toleration and the religious, philosophical, political, and legal arguments about 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Barry Kosmin & Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey 2008, 
http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2009). 
 20. Edwin S. Gaustad, Religious Tests, Constitutions, and “Christian Nation,” in RELIGION IN A 
REVOLUTIONARY AGE 218, 235 (Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert eds., 1994) (quoting Madison’s 
“Detached Memoranda,” WM. & MARY Q., 3d ser.3, 554-56 (Elizabeth Fleet ed. 1946)).  
 21. Rainer Forst, Pierre Bayle’s Reflexive Theory of Toleration, in TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS: 
NOMOS XLVIII 78, 79 (Melissa S. Williams & Jeremy Waldron, eds., 2008).  
 22. Maurice Cranston, Toleration, in 8 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 143 (Paul Edwards ed., 
1972) (emphasis in original).  
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toleration that provided background to the First Amendment and should guide its 
interpretation today.  From that history I develop three principles that are then 
illustrated in the rest of the Article.  First, in the constitutional setting, toleration is 
a political and legal principle that is skeptical about religious truth-claims and 
accordingly denies the state the power to enforce religious “truth” through force or 
law.  Second, tolerance protects the individual against the power of both church 
and state.  Third, although toleration arose primarily from the diversity among 
Christian sects in Europe and the young United States, the United States is now the 
“world’s most religiously diverse nation,”23 encompassing Muslims, Buddhists, 
Sikhs, Hindus, Atheists, and increasing numbers of nonreligious, as well as Jews 
and Christians.24  Tolerance is more able to accept the new diversity than 
traditional interpretations of free exercise and establishment.  
A. The Wars of Religious Intolerance  
In European history, the modern principle of toleration developed in reaction 
to Europe’s background culture of “coercive uniformity” of Christian church and 
state and the 16th and 17th century Wars of Religion among the Christian 
churches.25  That “coercive uniformity” can be explained by considering the 
religious argument of the great Christian theologian, Saint Augustine of Hippo, 
who wrote in a famous fifth-century letter that force could be used to convert 
individuals to the Christian faith: “You are [mistakenly] of opinion that no one 
should be compelled to follow righteousness; and yet you read that the householder 
said to his servants, ‘Whomsoever you shall find, compel them to come in.’”26  
The notorious words “compel them to come in” are from a parable in the New 
Testament’s Gospel of Luke, where Jesus speaks of a man who invited many guests 
to his banquet.  After the invited guests sent excuses,  
[T]he householder in anger said to his servant, “Go out quickly to the streets and 
lanes of the city, and bring in the poor and maimed and blind and lame.” 
And the servant said, “Sir, what you commanded has been done, and still there is 
room.” And the master said to the servant, “Go out to the highways and hedges, 
and compel people to come in, that my house may be filled. 
For I tell you, none of those men who were invited shall taste my banquet.”27 
Although Augustine’s exegesis of the scriptural text may be questionable, the 
“compel them to come in” language—which to modern ears sounds unacceptably 
intolerant—was influential in Christian history.  The logic of Augustine’s position 
was that if Christianity is true, and therefore leads the individual to the highest 
good of eternal salvation, then it is good for individuals to be brought to the truth 
by any means, including the use of force.  Therefore the state should employ its 
                                                                                                     
 23. ECK, supra note 13.   
 24. Cathy Lynn Grossman, Most Religious Groups in USA Have Lost Ground, Survey Says, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2009-03-09-american-religion-
ARIS_N.htm. 
 25. JAMES H. HUTSON, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES 11 (2008). 
 26. St. Augustine, Letter 93 to Vincentius, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102093.htm (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2009) (emphasis added). 
 27. Luke 14:21-24 (emphasis added). 
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force of arms to impose the church’s truth, precisely because the City of Man is 
subordinate to the City of God and temporal health is inferior to spiritual.  In the 
intolerant, pre-Wars of Religion Europe, as well as in the American colonies 
founded in that era, the “governing metaphor in church-state relations” was thus for 
the “civil magistrate to establish a close, even proprietary relationship with the 
church and authorized him to employ force to promote the church’s doctrinal and 
material interests.”28  In other words, the state promoted the church’s truth and was 
intolerant of all other religions and philosophies. 
Increasing divisions among Christians about who possessed the truth—the 
Catholic Church or the Protestant Reformers—led to the bitter and brutal 16th and 
17th century Wars of Religion, when European states fought to the death for the 
sake of religious truth.  The exhaustion from those wars eventually persuaded states 
to accept their neighbors rather than kill them and a political principle of toleration 
emerged.29 Although for religious reasons all sides wanted their vision of the truth 
to govern, the death and destruction eventually persuaded nations to build a 
political peace that offered an end to warfare.  As a leading historian of the English 
Civil Wars explained, by 1660 “[t]he conviction had gained strength in English 
thought that the ends of national life in the modern world could not be attained 
until the divisive and destructive energies of religious conflict had been tamed by 
toleration.”30  Thus the belief that one religious truth could govern all nations and 
citizens gave way to religious pluralism.  The political reality demanded toleration 
of conflicting truths.   
B. From Religious Intolerance to Philosophical Tolerance 
New philosophical accounts of tolerance arose in response to the political and 
religious situation in Europe and challenged the old Augustinian framework.  
French Protestant Pierre Bayle provided a different interpretation of the “compel 
them to come in” passage that had previously justified intolerance.  Arguing that 
Scripture does not command immoral behavior, Bayle provided a moral reading of 
the gospel according to which the “compel them to come in” text is properly read 
to mean that unbelievers must be given arguments about faith, but if they refuse the 
message there is nothing more that Christians can do.31  Common morality, rather 
than religious doctrine, provided the basis for toleration; according to Bayle, 
“[b]ecause we have a common morality, there is a vantage point from which 
everyone, whatever their religious views, can see the justification for toleration.”32    
English philosopher John Locke gave a principled basis to the new ideal of 
tolerance; his ideas were influential in the English colonies and later in the framing 
of the U.S. Constitution.  Locke’s famous A Letter Concerning Toleration focused 
                                                                                                     
 28. HUTSON, supra note 25, at 11. See also Forst, TOLERATION, supra note 21, at 85 (an account of 
Augustine’s “compel them to come in”).  
 29. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 1 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (hereinafter 
“RAWLS, JUSTICE”). 
 30. W.K. JORDAN, IV THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND: ATTAINMENT 
OF THE THEORY AND ACCOMMODATIONS IN THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS (1640-1660), at 467 (1940).  
 31. J.B. Schneewind, Bayle, Locke, and the Concept of Toleration, in PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND 
THE QUESTION OF INTOLERANCE 3, 7 (Mehdi Amin Razavi & David Ambuel eds., 1997). 
 32. Id.  
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on the individual conscience, arguing contra Augustine that the individual must not 
be compelled to religious truth but should freely choose it.33   According to Locke, 
“no other human being or institution has any authority regarding the relation 
between an individual and God: each one stands alone before God, on the basis of 
his own conviction and conscience.”34  That emphasis on the freedom of the 
individual conscience led Locke to be suspicious of both states and churches that 
attempted to coerce the individual conscience to believe.35  Thus in Locke’s view, 
the old coercive uniformity of church and state had to give way to the freedom of 
the individual conscience.  
On this point of liberty of conscience, Locke’s thought was theological and 
Protestant, focusing on the religious reasons for honoring the ideal of free 
conscience over the claims of church or state.  From such theological beliefs, 
however, developed political and legal principles: Because the individual holds the 
right to religious freedom, states and churches may not use force to impose “the 
truth” upon the citizenry.  Focusing on the claims of individual conscience made 
Locke more skeptical of the truth claims of the churches, leading to the conviction 
that “[n]o side has good reasons to declare its own convictions the only ‘truth’ and 
impose it on others by legal or political means.”36  There were limits to Locke’s 
tolerance, however.  Locke did not tolerate Catholics or atheists,37 arguing “those 
are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God.”38  
C. From Philosophical to Constitutional Tolerance 
Locke’s philosophy and his interpretation of the liberty of conscience 
influenced the Framers of the U.S. Constitution.39  The Framers initially 
distinguished themselves from the old states of Europe when they drafted the U.S. 
Constitution, whose only mention of religion was the text of Article VI: “[N]o 
Religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public 
Trust under the United States.”40  That groundbreaking language marked a shift 
from prior practice in Europe and the states.  At the time of the Constitution’s 
drafting, eleven states had religious qualifications for government officials, 
following the pattern in Britain, where monarchs were required to be members of 
the Church of England.41  Although critics of the Constitution feared that the 
                                                                                                     
 33. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 1689), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerati.htm. 
 34. Forst, TOLERATION, supra note 21, at 85.  
 35. Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, in STANFORD ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/. 
 36. Forst, TOLERATION, supra note 21, at 90. See also Tuckness, supra note 35.  
 37. LOCKE, supra note 33. See also Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the 
Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839, 856 (1985/1986) (“If the Founders' generation truly sought 
freedom for religious beliefs, however, I find no evidence that they were equally concerned with 
freedom for irreligion.”).  
 38. LOCKE, supra note 33. See also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment 
Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 376 (2002) (explaining that Locke’s toleration didn’t extend to atheists 
(or to other Christians)). See also Kurland, supra note 37. 
 39. Feldman, supra note 38, at 354. 
 40. U. S. CONST. Art. VI. 
 41. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 166 (2005).   
2010] A TOLERANT FIRST AMENDMENT 31 
absence of God and religion from a text that lacked prayers, invocations or a 
reference to Christianity would undermine the government and even permit “deists, 
atheists, &c.” to govern, the secular Constitution was ratified.42  One reason for the 
success of a secular Constitution was that “as a practical matter, many delegates 
recognized that distinctive historical traditions, colony by colony, region by region, 
even decade by decade, made any unifying [religious] assertion highly 
problematic.”43  
When James Madison was involved in drafting the religious liberty clause of 
the Virginia Bill of Rights, which was a precursor to the First Amendment, he 
rejected George Mason’s proposal to include the word “toleration” in the clause.44  
Instead, the Virginia Bill protected “the full and free exercise of religion.”45  
“Madison objected on the ground that the word ‘toleration’ implies an act of 
legislative grace, which in Locke's understanding it was.”46  Madison, whose 
suspicion of the state led him to draft a Constitution that created a government of 
limited and enumerated powers, focused on the individual’s right to religious 
freedom against the state, not on the state’s decision to honor religious freedom.47  
Although Madison originally believed that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary 
because the Constitution gave the government no power over religion, he 
participated in drafting the original amendments in order to secure the 
Constitution’s ratification.  His early drafts of the First Amendment repeatedly 
recognized the “equal rights of conscience,” but the conscience language 
disappeared during the House and Senate conferences, and the final language of the 
First Amendment became “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”48  
Madison’s arguments about religious liberty in Virginia and in Congress 
should not be interpreted as opposition to tolerance.  The Free Exercise Clause 
protected liberty of conscience as an individual right and not as a gift of the 
government.  That interpretation of liberty arose from the old European concept of 
toleration that kept the peace among warring factions.49  According to the late 
constitutional scholar Philip Kurland, the Establishment Clause then provided a 
“new concept” that protected and extended toleration, namely the separation of 
church and state: 
[T]he separation clause had a greater function than the assurance of toleration of 
                                                                                                     
 42. Gaustad, supra note 20, at 225-26.  
 43. Id. at 225. 
 44. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1443 (1990). 
 45. Id.   
 46. Id. See also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 555-56 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining Mason’s 
and Madison’s approaches to the First Amendment). 
 47. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 556 (O’Connor,. J., dissenting). See also SANFORD H. COBB, THE 
RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 492 (1970) (noting that Madison objected to the word 
“toleration” as belonging to “a system where was an established Church, and where a certain liberty of 
worship was granted, not of right, but of grace”). 
 48. MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 75-
89 (2d ed. 2002). See also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). 
 49. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1961). 
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dissenting religious beliefs and practices.  To suggest but two lessons of the evils 
resulting from the alliance of church and state, there was abundant evidence of the 
contributions of the churches to the warfare among nations as well as the conflict 
within them and equally obvious was the inhibition on scientific endeavor that 
followed from the acceptance by the state of church dogma. . . .  Limited powers 
of government were not instituted to expand the realm of power of religious 
organizations, but rather in favor of freedom of action and thought by the people.50  
Thus in the American setting, the principle of toleration developed into an 
individual constitutional right of religious liberty that set limits on both state and 
church, the appropriate lesson from the legacy of Europe, where the union of 
church and state had constrained religious freedom.  
Although Locke influenced the Framers, their work should not be confused 
with his.51  We must distinguish constitutional toleration (i.e., the political and legal 
principles found in the Constitution) from the religious and philosophical 
arguments that support it. The Framers drafted a Constitution, not a philosophical 
treatise.  
Revulsion at continued bloodshed, belief in a right to form one’s own religious 
opinion, appreciation of diversity, the thought that God leads us by different 
paths—any of these reasons might move people toward acceptance [of the 
principle of tolerance].  We need no agreement on reasons for accepting the 
principle. What we ask of those who accept toleration is only a public political 
commitment.52  
The meaning of that public political commitment is examined in the next 
section.  
D. Understanding Contemporary Tolerance 
Ironically it was the late philosopher John Rawls, the author of Political 
Liberalism, whose theory provided a basis for modern politics that is neither 
philosophical nor religious.  Rawls’s political theory provides a fuller explanation 
of constitutional tolerance in a manner that clarifies the importance of interpreting 
the First Amendment to require tolerance rather than a free exercise right to rule by 
religion.  Four of Rawls’s key concepts shed light on current religious disputes.  
Just as many religious groups today insist that their Christian theology must 
establish the law, the Warriors of Religion in Europe believed their religion was 
true, so they fought to establish it as the religion of the state or prince.  First, and in 
contrast to the one-true view, Rawlsian liberals, like the Framers, accept pluralism 
among people’s comprehensive beliefs;53 in the modern era, no single 
comprehensive doctrine compels the allegiance of all citizens. Pluralism is an 
abiding feature of our lives and will not fade.  Second, a political conception of 
justice must therefore be found that does not impose one comprehensive doctrine 
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(like Catholicism, Kantianism, Mormonism, Secular Humanism, or Islam) on one’s 
fellow citizens.54  Third, the political conception of justice will be based on an 
overlapping consensus in which citizens can agree on the political and 
constitutional essentials of their society, even though they disagree about their 
comprehensive doctrines.55  Fourth, decisions within the overlapping consensus 
should be made only on the basis of reasons that appeal to all citizens, and so 
citizens must employ public reason.56  Public reason means that citizens should not 
appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines but to arguments 
that their fellow citizens may “reasonably be expected to endorse.”57  Endorse is 
the key word here; I may understand why a faithful Catholic would vote the Pope’s 
teachings into law, but, as a non-Catholic, I cannot be expected to endorse 
government according to a faith I do not share.  A Christian should not ask her 
fellow citizens to be governed by the Bible because all citizens cannot endorse the 
Bible as a source of law.  
These four features of political liberalism explain both the tension between 
religion and democracy as well as why toleration is required in a liberal democracy. 
Believers instinctively want their own comprehensive perspective to govern all 
aspects of life, including legal details about marriage and the family.  Yet pluralism 
renders this desire impossible unless force is used to impose one’s views on 
another.  Instead of inflicting their views on others, citizens should meet on the 
common ground of political justice, an independent “module” shared by all.  
Although in the 17th century, philosophers like Pierre Bayle believed that 
“common morality” could unite all citizens to a tolerant perspective, in the pluralist 
21st century Americans share no common morality and therefore must be united on 
political and legal grounds. 
The tolerant citizen recognizes that she may not impose her religious truth on 
others, and therefore asks if constitutional principles such as liberty and equality 
support a proposed law or not.  The discussion should always begin with political 
and legal principles.  That is not to say that constitutional or political principles 
provide easy or determinate solutions in every situation.  They should, however, 
provide the premises of the argument from which the debate starts.  To consider 
this point in another context, an analysis of women’s rights that begins with biblical 
texts is less likely to support women’s equality than one that starts with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Religious traditions have different 
values from the constitutional tradition; the former should not replace the latter.  
From this history, I take three claims about tolerance that are illustrated in the 
next three parts of the Article.  First, because toleration is a political and legal 
principle, toleration is skeptical about religious truth-claims and accordingly denies 
the state the power to enforce religious truth through force or law.  Second, 
tolerance protects the individual against the power of both church and state.  Third, 
toleration must extend beyond the diversity among Christian sects in old Europe 
and the young United States and stretch in directions not anticipated by Locke or 
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the Framers.  The United States is now the “world’s most religiously diverse 
nation.”58  As in the past, acceptance of diversity is more likely to begin with a 
principle of toleration rather than with alternative theories of respect for persons, 
equality or liberty of conscience.  
In Part III, I explain why the first claim, that religious truth must not be 
enforced by law, is confirmed by the recent constitutional controversies 
surrounding gay marriage. 
III. RELIGIOUS TRUTH MUST NOT BE ENFORCED BY LAW 
The intensity of recent debates about the legality of gay marriage confirms that 
modern wars of religion can be fought at the ballot box as well as on the battlefield. 
Toleration’s first lesson, that religious truth should not be imposed by force of law, 
was repeatedly violated during the California campaign about Proposition 8, a voter 
initiative that banned gay marriage in response to the California Supreme Court’s 
ruling that gay marriage was required by the state constitution’s equal protection 
clause.59  In contrast to religious citizens who begin their analysis of gay marriage 
with a theological question—is it justified by the Bible, or the Elders, or Mormon 
or Catholic Theology, or Papal Teaching—the tolerant citizen recognizes that she 
must not impose her religious truth on others and therefore asks if constitutional 
principles such as liberty and equality support gay rights or not.  The discussion 
should always begin with political and legal principles. The following pages 
describe the intolerant circumstances in California (in Part III-A) and explain (in 
Part III-B) why a theory of tolerance is necessary to correct the situation and 
restore the constitutional order. 
A. The Religious Debate over Proposition 8 
In one television advertising campaign, two actors portraying Mormon 
missionaries forced their way into the well-kept home of a married lesbian couple. 
“Hi, we’re here from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,” one says: 
“We’re here to take away your rights,” says his partner. 
The missionaries then rip the wedding rings from the women’s fingers and ransack 
their house until they find the women’s marriage license, which they destroy. 
“Hey, we have rights,” one of the women says. 
“Not if we can help it,” answers the missionary. 60 
The ad, depicted above, captured the tone of the debate about Proposition 8, an 
initiative to amend the state constitution to recognize “[o]nly marriage between a 
man and a woman” in response to the California Supreme Court’s ruling that the 
equal protection clause of the California Constitution required the state to legalize 
gay marriage.61  During the campaign, several Christian groups, led by the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, vocally supported the proposition and 
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contributed large amounts of money to its passage, while gay rights groups 
criticized the numerous faith-based attempts to influence the vote.  One No-on-8 
group created a website to keep track of Mormon contributions to the Yes-on-8 
drive and estimated that Mormons had contributed $20 million toward passage of 
the initiative.  A pro-8 spokesman decried the website and the “despicable” ad: 
“I am appalled at the level of Mormon-bashing that went on during the Proposition 
8 campaign and continues to this day,” . . . .  “If this activity were directed against 
any other church, if someone put up a website that targeted Jews or Catholics in a 
similar fashion for the mere act of participating in a political campaign, it would 
be widely and rightfully condemned.”62 
The complaints of Mormon-bashing were then rebutted with arguments that the gay 
rights supporters were debating politics, not religion, and were appropriately 
criticizing the political activity of the Mormon Church.  
Although the Mormon support for Proposition 8 received much of the media’s 
attention, the Mormons were only part of a broad coalition of religious groups who 
joined to protectmarriage.com.  The campaign for Proposition 8 was “one of the 
most ambitious interfaith political organizing efforts ever attempted in the state,” as 
Catholics and evangelical Christians participated in large numbers and members of 
the Protect Marriage Coalition also “reach[ed] out to Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and 
Hindus.”63  “Moreover, political analysts say, the alliances across religious 
boundaries could herald new ways of building coalitions around political issues in 
California.  ‘Pan-religious, faith-based political action strategies . . . I think we are 
going to see a lot more of [this] in the future,’” predicted one professor.64  The 
Religious Left eventually responded to the Religious Right with videos showing 
priests and rabbis explaining their faiths’ support for gay marriage.65  The situation 
is reminiscent of the post-Reformation arguments about religious truth, with Right 
and Left arguing that their perspectives on the morality of gay marriage were true 
and therefore should be imposed as law. 
Post-election news stories explained that Proposition 8 passed because of 
support from religious voters.  “Californians voted their religion, not their political 
party, when they pushed Proposition 8 to victory and banned same-sex marriage in 
the state . . . . ‘What the exit polls say is that religion trumps party affiliation when 
it comes to social issues,’ said Mark DiCamillo, director of the Field Poll.”66  
In response to Proposition 8’s success, tens of thousands of protesters picketed 
Mormon institutions around the country, from California to New York.67  About 
2000 protesters chanted complaints against the church at the Westwood Mormon 
                                                                                                     
 62. Garrison & Lin, supra note 60.  
 63. Jessica Garrison, California Churches Plan a Big Push Against Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/24/local/me-faith24. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. John Wildermuth, The Voters: Majority of Blacks, Catholics, Who Supported Obama, Backed 
Measure, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 6, 2008, at A18. 
 67. Ben Arnoldy, Gay Activists Protest Mormon Church, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 13, 2008, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1113/p03s07-uspo.html; New Yorkers Protest Gay Marriage Ban 
Outside Mormon Church, FoxNews.com, Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/printer_ 
friendly_story/0,3566,451446,00.html. 
36 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
Temple near Los Angeles;68 they shouted “bigots” and “shame on you” at men near 
the temple.69  Gay marriage supporters also created a new website, 
invalidateprop8.org; “[f]or every $5 donated, . . . a postcard will be sent to the 
president of the Mormon church condemning ‘the reprehensible role the Church of 
Latter-day Saints leadership played in denying all Californians equal rights under 
the law.’”70  “No More Mr. Nice Gay” adorned a placard in San Francisco;71 “Did 
you cast a ballot or a stone?”, “Latter Day H8,” and “Church of Mormon” with an 
X drawn over the second M to read “Moron” appeared in New York.72  The New 
York protesters warned religious groups against taking similar legal action against 
gay rights there; they feared success in California would “embolden the religious 
right” to “train their eye on other states” such as New York.73 
In addition to the picketing, numerous Proposition 8 opponents called for the 
revocation of the Mormons’ tax-exempt status, arguing that the church had lobbied 
for legislation in violation of the tax code.74  The California Fair Political Practices 
Commission investigated the contributions of religious groups to the Yes-on-8 
campaign in order to see if the amounts were accurately reported; the Secretary of 
State released the figures to the public.75  With the lists of contributors publicly 
available, gays and lesbians then boycotted businesses whose owners or employees 
had contributed to the pro-8 cause.76  
The Proposition 8 supporters then rejoined that they are entitled to “exercis[e] 
their constitutional right to freedom of religion” by supporting moral policies 
consistent with that faith.77  They also argued that the tax laws support their right to 
speak publicly about moral issues without losing their exemption.78  One of their 
most visible responses was a full-page ad in the New York Times criticizing the 
actions of the gay rights groups as a “mob veto,” accusing the Proposition 8 
opponents of practicing “violence and intimidation” against the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints and other religions in order to “cow [their] opponents 
into submission,” and identifying the demonstrators as “mobs, seeking not to 
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persuade but to intimidate.”79  NoMobVeto.org warned that “[r]eligious wars are 
wrong; they are also dangerous.  Those who fail to condemn or seem to condone 
that intimidation are at fault as well.  Consciously or not, they are numbing the 
public conscience, which endangers all of us.”80  And the NoMobVeto group 
pledged:  
Therefore, despite our fundamental disagreements with one another, we announce 
today that we will stand shoulder to shoulder to defend any house of worship—
Jewish, Christian, Hindu, whatever—from violence, regardless of the cause that 
violence seeks to serve. Furthermore, beginning today, we commit ourselves to 
exposing and publicly shaming anyone who resorts to the rhetoric of anti-religious 
bigotry—against any faith, on any side of any cause, for any reason.81 
Meanwhile, some gay activists chided themselves for not anticipating the 
strength of the religious pro-8 vote and confronting the Mormons more directly and 
explicitly on the basis of their religious dogma: “‘We should have been much 
stronger in pointing out the LDS positions: barring women from positions of 
power, opposing stem cell research, opposing reproductive choice, contraception, 
their historic exclusion of black people from their church until 1978.’”82 
At the end of the day, complaints of intolerance were lodged against all sides, 
with the religious groups accused of intolerance and bigotry against gays and the 
gay groups accused of intolerance and bigotry against religion.83  
This situation illustrates my argument that it is dangerous to rip free exercise 
from its roots in toleration.  The purpose of the First Amendment was to provide an 
environment in which everyone’s liberty of conscience was protected and tolerated, 
not to authorize citizens to identify their own free exercise as a reason to limit the 
constitutional rights of others.  Whenever free exercise becomes a justification for 
freely imposing one’s religious beliefs on others, religious belief becomes a 
weapon rather than a right.  Recalling free exercise’s roots in toleration undermines 
the contemporary argument that religious citizens have a free exercise right to 
impose their religious beliefs on their fellow citizens.  Tolerance offers a different 
approach than free exercise to the issue of gay marriage. 
B. How Tolerance Differs from the Religious Approach to Gay Marriage 
As noted above, a central lesson in the history of toleration, from St. 
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Augustine’s “compel them to come in” to the European Wars of Religion, is that 
“government should not use force to try to bring people to the true religion.”84  The 
battle of religious truth is unending, and, as NoMobVeto suggests, may turn 
violent.85  In Europe, the principle of toleration required all sides in the religious 
wars to stop coercing one another to follow the “truth” and to accept—not to like or 
agree with—their religious differences.  As my first principle holds, toleration is 
skeptical about religious truth-claims and accordingly denies the state the power to 
enforce religious truth through force or law.  When citizens use the force of law to 
impose their religious beliefs on their fellow citizens, they violate the principle of 
toleration. 
In the Proposition 8 discussion, it is indisputable that the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints based its opposition to gay marriage on purely religious 
reasons and sources, primarily the Christian Bible and Mormon theology, and 
therefore sought to use the power of the law to enforce religious truth.  The 
religious grounds for Proposition 8 are explained in detail on the Mormon website 
about “The Divine Institution of Marriage”: 
Marriage is sacred, ordained of God from before the foundation of the world.  
After creating Adam and Eve, the Lord God pronounced them husband and wife, 
of which Adam said, “Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and 
shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh.”  [Genesis 2:24.]  Jesus 
Christ cited Adam’s declaration when he affirmed the divine origins of the 
marriage covenant: “Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning 
made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and 
mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh?  Wherefore 
they are no more twain, but one flesh.”  [Matthew 19:4-6.] 86 
In 1995, “The Family: A Proclamation to the World” declared the following 
unchanging truths regarding marriage: 
We, the First Presidency and the Council of the Twelve Apostles of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, solemnly proclaim that marriage 
between a man and a woman is ordained of God and that the family is central to 
the Creator’s plan for the eternal destiny of His children . . . . The family is 
ordained of God.  Marriage between man and woman is essential to His eternal 
plan.  Children are entitled to birth within the bonds of matrimony, and to be 
reared by a father and a mother who honor marital vows with complete fidelity.  
The Proclamation also teaches, “Gender is an essential characteristic of 
individual premortal, mortal, and eternal identity and purpose.”  The account in 
Genesis of Adam and Eve being created and placed on earth emphasizes the 
creation of two distinct genders: “So God created man in his own image, in the 
image of God created he him; male and female created he them.”  [Genesis 
1:27].87 
The church urged its members to donate their time and energy to preserve the 
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“sacred nature of marriage.”88  
In contrast, the gay rights groups relied predominantly on arguments about 
equality and liberty, which are legal values enshrined in the U.S. and California 
Constitutions and not dependent upon theological reasoning.  As noted above, 
however, liberal religious groups also filled the airwaves with theological defenses 
of gay marriage.  The 2008 election revealed, moreover, that some political liberals 
are religious conservatives; just like the Mormons, Barack Obama refused to 
support equal protection for gay marriage because he believes that marriage is 
sacred and gay marriage is prohibited by the Bible.  Although Obama did not 
endorse Proposition 8, he observed “that marriage, in the minds of a lot of voters, 
has a religious connotation.  I know that’s true in the African-American [religious] 
community, for example.”89  That was true in California as the African-American 
religious voters sent Obama to the White House and Proposition 8 to victory.90  
Obama’s explicit references to his own Christian faith and faith-based policies 
on the campaign trail were consistent with the recent trend for Democrats of faith, 
who, disappointed by their losses to the more Republican Religious Right in the 
2000 and 2004 elections, have recently sought to attract voters by emphasizing 
their own religious values.91  The gay marriage issue, however, which put Obama 
on the same side as the Mormons defending sacred marriage instead of equal 
protection, is a stark reminder that neither liberal nor conservative religion—no 
religion of any sort—is the appropriate basis of the law in a tolerant society.  
Tolerance must challenge all attempts of both Religious Right and Left to provide 
the content of the law.   A tolerant society does not base its laws on religious truth 
of any flavor. 
On the question of gay marriage, the stance of political justice and public 
reason is easy to identify.  Unlike Obama or the Mormons, Catholics, or 
evangelical Christians of protectmarriage.com, who begin their analysis of gay 
marriage with a theological question—is it justified by the Bible, or the Elders, or 
Mormon or Catholic Theology, or Papal Teaching—the tolerant citizen recognizes 
that she may not impose her religious truth on others, and therefore asks if 
constitutional principles such as liberty and equality support gay rights or not.  The 
discussion should always begin with political and legal principles.  That is not to 
say that constitutional or political principles provide easy or determinate solutions 
in every situation.  They should, however, provide the premises of the argument 
from which the debate starts.  To consider this point in another context, an analysis 
of women’s rights that begins with biblical texts is less likely to support women’s 
equality than one that starts with the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Religious traditions have different values from the constitutional 
tradition; the former should not replace the latter.  
This point explains why Obama was mistaken to argue in The Audacity of 
Hope “[w]hat our deliberative, pluralistic democracy does demand is that the 
religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, rather than religion-
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specific, values.”92  The gay marriage debate demonstrates the futility and 
dishonesty of the translation enterprise.  If Obama and Governor Mitt Romney both 
oppose gay marriage because it violates Christian or biblical principles, nothing is 
gained if Obama translates the Bible into political language while Romney openly 
cites church elders.  It is still the rule of religion instead of the rule of law, with 
concealed instead of open faith.  The Wars of Religion never end if religious 
groups work incessantly to turn or translate their theology into law.  Religion-based 
politics will always give us the back-and-forth of Proposition 8, as groups angrily 
seek to make the law consistent with their own religion instead of democratically 
seeking the sphere of consensus.  
Obama himself contributed to the suspicion and instability that accompany 
religion-based policies when it was discovered after the presidential election that as 
a state candidate in 1996 he unequivocally supported gay marriage and promised to 
“fight efforts to prohibit such marriages.”93  The report raised questions about why 
he changed his position.94  “In a January 2004 interview . . . , Obama clearly stated 
that lack of support for full marriage equality was a matter of strategy rather than 
principle, but in even more recent comments, it appears he is backing off even 
further, saying it is more of a religious issue, and also a ‘state’ issue, so he favors 
civil unions. Both are compromises most gays do not support.”95  Religious, 
political, and strategic all merge into one, which leads to suspicion that religion is 
driving policy or being used as a political prop, and shows the inadequacy of 
Obama’s “translation” policy.  
Whether faith is hidden or open, the legacy of liberal tolerance is the 
understanding that democracies cannot be governed by religious principles; the 
clash in California illustrates that legal controversies cannot be settled on religious 
grounds unless one religion is imposed upon citizens who do not share that faith.  
Accordingly, democratic citizens must oppose efforts to turn religious convictions 
into law and to re-Christianize our public discourse.  Part III-C of this Article 
explains why free exercise does not justify the rule of religious beliefs. 
C. Free Exercise Does Not Justify Intolerance 
The recommendation to base the law on constitutional principles will appear 
harsh to some believers who feel “bracketed” or excluded from, or trivialized in, 
the public square because of their religion.  Originally it was conservative religious 
groups who argued that the secularism of modern politics unfairly marginalized 
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and derided religious conviction and undermined their religious freedom.96  Now 
both conservatives and liberals, led by President Obama, have discovered political 
religion:  
Surely secularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the 
door before entering the public square; Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, 
William Jennings Bryan, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King, Jr.—indeed the 
majority of great reformers in American history—not only were motivated by faith 
but repeatedly used religious language to argue their causes.  To say that men and 
women should not inject their “personal morality” into public-policy debates is a 
practical absurdity; our law is by definition a codification of morality, much of it 
grounded in the Judeo-Christian tradition.97 
Obama neglects to mention that the starting point for our law and politics is 
precisely the morality that has already been codified into the state and federal 
constitutions.  Emphasizing its “Judeo-Christian” nature is intolerant of the 
Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists and Hindus who populate the United States.  Moreover, 
there is no “Judeo-Christian tradition” to govern us; the term conflates Judaism 
with Christianity.  Judaism and Christianity are two separate religions with their 
own traditions. Americans share the constitutional tradition and not a Judeo-
Christian or any other religious tradition.  The United States is different from 
Christian Europe, where Pierre Bayle could hope for a common morality that 
would unite all citizens.  The American citizenry is religiously and philosophically 
diverse and does not share belief in any Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King, Jr., did not 
impose their version of Christianity upon their fellow citizens; instead they sought 
to apply the guarantees protected in the Constitution to everyone. Many of the 
Christian churches of their eras supported slavery.  As David Richards has 
explained, the abolitionist dissent was not successful because it was religious, but 
due to its moral independence:  
[T]he interpretive understanding of the role of public reason in such abolitionist 
dissent is no more its religious or irreligious character than its scientific or anti-
scientific character, but its critical moral independence in all domains (including 
science and religion) in forging arguments of public reason in opposition to the 
role that both dominant established science and religion played in the defense of 
slavery and racism.98 
The tolerant democracy does not start every discussion anew with the religious 
and philosophical commitments of its citizens; instead, it brackets everyone’s 
convictions so that peace may reign.  A Kantian Californian should not vote the 
categorical imperative; a Rawlsian Californian should not vote the difference 
principle; a Mormon should not vote the divine teaching on marriage.  Although 
these are not legal restrictions that can be enforced at the ballot box, a tolerant 
society cannot survive without a tolerant culture as well as a tolerant law, where 
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individuals choose to be tolerant of their fellow citizens.  Ideally their religions and 
philosophies will motivate them to be tolerant instead of to enforce their religions 
on others through their votes.  A free exercise that lacks tolerance becomes a 
principle of injustice rather than a right of liberty.   
Tolerant voting will not excite many passions because toleration is 
unsatisfactory in so many ways; as T.S. Eliot remarked, “‘The Christian does not 
wish to be tolerated.”’99  Many tolerated religions echo Eliot because “[t]oleration 
is always mere toleration.  It is less than equality just as it is distinct from 
liberty.”100  Maurice Cranston interpreted Eliot’s comment to mean that “[t]he 
Christian wanted something better—to be respected, honored, and loved.”101  
Within the Proposition 8 debate, even the Mormon church’s definition of tolerance 
was Christian and biblical, distinguishing itself from the legal and political 
definition of toleration and seeking to replace toleration with the theological and 
biblical principle of Christian love.  Addressing charges that its stance toward gay 
marriage was intolerant, the church argued that the gay 
appeal for “tolerance” advocates a very different meaning and outcome than that 
word has meant throughout most of American history and a different meaning than 
is found in the gospel of Jesus Christ.  The Savior taught a much higher concept, 
that of love.  “Love thy neighbor,” He admonished.  [Matt. 19:19.]  Jesus loved the 
sinner even while decrying the sin, as evidenced in the case of the woman taken in 
adultery: treating her kindly, but exhorting her to “sin no more.”   [John 8:11.]  
Tolerance as a gospel principle means love and forgiveness of one another, not 
“tolerating” transgression.      
In today’s secular world, the idea of tolerance has come to mean something 
entirely different.  Instead of love, it has come to mean condone—acceptance of 
wrongful behavior as the price of friendship.  Jesus taught that we love and care 
for one another without condoning transgression.  But today’s politically palatable 
definition insists that unless one accepts the sin he does not tolerate the sinner.        
As Elder Dallin H. Oaks has explained, 
Tolerance obviously requires a non-contentious manner of relating toward one 
another’s differences.  But tolerance does not require abandoning one’s standards 
or one’s opinions on political or public policy choices.  Tolerance is a way of 
reacting to diversity, not a command to insulate it from examination.102 
This extended quotation about the inadequacy of toleration from a religious 
perspective reinforces my point that the seemingly negative principle of toleration 
may protect more rights than her lofty sisters—love, equality, and even religious 
freedom.  Where Christian love forbids gay love, toleration accepts it.  Without a 
basis in toleration, free exercise may become the exercise of religious truth in a 
coercive manner.  Without toleration, free exercise may limit liberty rather than 
enhance it.  Without toleration, equality may not extend to sinners.  Without 
toleration, religious adherents will focus on religious truth and try to impose that 
truth on their neighbor in the name of love, rather than accepting that the parties 
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will always disagree about religious truth and therefore seeking to object and then 
accept.  
Michael Walzer explained the inevitable discomfort of some religious groups 
with tolerance, observing that although they can tolerate minority religious 
freedom, 
they have no tolerance for personal liberty outside the house of worship.  If 
sectarian communities aim to control the behavior of their own people, the more 
extreme members of religious majorities aim to control everyone’s behavior—in 
the name of a supposedly common (Judeo-Christian, say) tradition, of “family 
values,” or of their own certainties about what is right and wrong.  This is surely 
an example of religious intolerance.  It is a sign of the partial success of the regime 
of toleration, however, that antagonism is not directed against particular minority 
religions but rather against the ambience of freedom that the regime as a whole 
creates.103  
Walzer’s point was well-illustrated in the debate over Proposition 8, where the 
minority religions were recruited to join the coalition to limit social freedoms. 
Throughout the Proposition 8 debate, some supporters asserted “if this 
proposition had not passed, religious groups could have been forced to conduct 
same-sex weddings.”104  Really?  A tolerant First Amendment does not go so far; it 
objects to the church’s opposition to gay marriage but accepts its free exercise right 
not to be coerced into religious rituals.  With Locke, constitutional toleration does 
not believe in state-enforced, coercive faith.  Although divorce is legal, for 
example, Christian churches are not legally required to offer communion or 
remarriage to the divorced.  Ideally and tolerantly, the states will offer nonreligious 
marriage to all citizens and the churches will make their theological decisions about 
which marriages deserve church approval.   
This point about the liberty of churches suggests that a tolerant society respects 
the autonomy of churches to make their own decisions about religious matters.  In 
Part IV, I argue that tolerance sets some limits on religious organizations because 
constitutional tolerance must protect individuals against the power of both church 
and state.  
IV. TOLERANCE PROTECTS INDIVIDUALS AGAINST THE POWER OF BOTH CHURCH 
AND STATE 
The Free Exercise Clause arose from the Framers’ desire to protect individual 
liberty of conscience.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the religious 
freedom to believe is absolute,105 thus confirming the inviolability of the individual 
conscience, which may not be forced into belief by either church or state.  
While recognizing the absolute freedom of religious beliefs, however, the 
Court has also recognized that the law may regulate religious acts.106  In an early 
ruling, the Court held that a Mormon did not have a free exercise right to practice 
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polygamy;107 more recently, the Court held that a Native American did not have a 
free exercise right to use peyote in violation of the drug laws.108  The peyote case, 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, set the current 
standard for interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.  According to Smith, 
religious citizens are not above the law but, like everyone else, are subject to 
“neutral laws of general applicability.”109  The rule of Smith prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of religion but does not exempt religious believers from 
nondiscriminatory laws.110  
Although Smith was roundly criticized for eviscerating free exercise,111 its 
holding is consistent with a tolerant reading of the First Amendment.  The issue of 
the range of the government’s power to regulate religious acts can be reworded as a 
question about the limits of tolerance.  Although we dislike or disagree with our 
fellow citizens’ religious actions, we tolerate them unless . . . what?  What are the 
limits to toleration? 
The classic philosophical response to that question comes from John Stuart 
Mill’s On Liberty.  According to Mill, “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others.”112  A Millian reading of the Constitution favors the 
principle of autonomy and finds in the no-harm principle the appropriate limit of 
tolerance.  Some scholars have recommended interpreting the First Amendment 
from Mill’s perspective because doing so provides a “thick” theory that fully 
protects religious liberty.  Professor Beattie, for example, has argued that Locke’s 
notion of toleration protects only religious belief, not acts, and is consistent with 
Smith.113  Beattie prefers Mill, whose principles protect both belief and acts unless 
they harm others, and whose philosophy is more consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s, pre-Smith, Sherbert line of cases, which held that laws substantially 
burdening free exercise must be subjected to strict scrutiny.114 
According to the political and legal theory of the Constitution spelled out in 
Part III, however, citizens may not privilege their philosophical or religious 
theories of the Constitution and impose them on others.  A Millian is subjected to 
the same restrictions as a Mormon. Mill’s principles of autonomy and no-harm 
cannot provide a shared interpretation of the First Amendment.  The best way to 
avoid privileging a religious or philosophical reading of the Constitution is to hold 
all citizens to the same law, as Smith requires.  Having a religious law for some but 
not others undermines the peace and stability of the tolerant community.  Thus the 
free exercise protected by the Constitution is not a general principle of autonomy 
from the law’s regulation but an effort to identify a law that is shared by all.  
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In the name of free exercise, and even post-Smith, some courts and scholars 
have defended a theory of the First Amendment that protects not only Millian 
personal autonomy but also “church autonomy,” which is “a constitutionally 
protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government 
interference.”115  This theory is even more troubling than a personal autonomy 
interpretation of free exercise because the history of tolerance recognizes the 
dangers that churches may pose to individual religious freedom.  A tolerant First 
Amendment is wary of the power of churches to oppress individuals and therefore 
insists that the First Amendment allows no “citizen [or church] to become a law 
unto himself.”116  In contrast to that rule, in tort (Part IV-A(1)), property (Part IV-
A(2)) and employment law (Part IV-A(3)), the courts have too frequently allowed 
the churches to become a law unto themselves in a manner that violates individual 
liberty.  Thus they choose a standard that tolerance abhors, namely one that 
protects institutional churches from legal accountability to their members in the 
name of religious freedom. 
The ability of churches to undermine individual religious liberty is enhanced 
when the government provides funding to the churches to do so, as described in 
Part IV-B.  
A. Church Autonomy  
The Texas Supreme Court recently ignored the lessons of tolerance when it 
defended church autonomy to injure a teenage girl during an exorcism. 
1. Torts 
Laura Schubert was a seventeen-year-old member of the Pleasant Glade 
Assembly of God, a Christian church that “believes in the literal teachings of the 
Bible with respect to spirits, demons, demon possession, and the ‘casting out’ of 
demons.”117  During a weekend spent at her church, while her parents were out of 
town, Schubert attended a worship service on Sunday morning, and then collapsed 
during a Sunday evening service.118 
After her collapse, several church members took Laura to a classroom where they 
“laid hands” on her and prayed.  According to Laura, church members forcibly 
held her arms crossed over her chest, despite her demands to be freed.  According 
to those present, Laura clenched her fists, gritted her teeth, foamed at the mouth, 
made guttural noises, cried, yelled, kicked, sweated, and hallucinated.  The parties 
sharply dispute whether these actions were the cause or the result of her physical 
restraint. 
Church members, moreover, disagreed about whether Laura's actions were a ploy 
for attention or the result of spiritual activity.  Laura stated during the episode that 
Satan or demons were trying to get her.  After the episode, Laura also allegedly 
began telling other church members about a “vision.”  Yet, her collapse and 
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subsequent reaction to being restrained may also have been the result of fatigue 
and hypoglycemia.  Laura had not eaten anything substantive that day and had 
missed sleep because of the spiritual activities that weekend.  Whatever the cause, 
Laura was eventually released after she calmed down and complied with requests 
to say the name “Jesus.” 
[ . . . ] 
On Wednesday evening, Laura attended the weekly youth service presided by Rod 
Linzay.  According to Linzay, Laura began to act in a manner similar to the 
Sunday evening episode.  Laura testified that she curled up into a fetal position 
because she wanted to be left alone.  Church members, however, took her unusual 
posture as a sign of distress.  At some point, Laura collapsed and writhed on the 
floor.  Again, there is conflicting evidence about whether Laura's actions were the 
cause or result of being physically restrained by church members and about the 
duration and force of the restraint.  According to Laura, the youth, under the 
direction of Linzay and his wife, Holly, held her down. Laura testified, moreover, 
that she was held in a “spread eagle” position with several youth members holding 
down her arms and legs.  The church's senior pastor, Lloyd McCutchen, was 
summoned to the youth hall where he played a tape of pacifying music, placed his 
hand on Laura's forehead, and prayed. During the incident, Laura suffered carpet 
burns, a scrape on her back, and bruises on her wrists and shoulders.119  
Afterward, Schubert suffered from depression, suicidal tendencies, anger, weight 
loss, and sleeplessness.120  She dropped out of high school and, after being 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder due to the church events, collected 
disability payments.121  Laura’s father, Tom, complained to the church’s senior 
pastor, Lloyd McCutchen, who decided not to discipline the parties involved.122 
Laura and her parents then sued the church, but the Texas Supreme Court 
disallowed her tort recovery on the grounds that the First Amendment protected the 
church from liability.123  
In the name of the First Amendment and a theory that constitutional scholars 
have labeled “church autonomy,”124 the courts have frequently protected churches 
against the legal claims of their members,125 thus allowing the churches to do what 
they wish to members like Laura Schubert.  In contrast, a tolerant First Amendment 
questions church autonomy because it recognizes the dangers that both state and 
church may pose to individual religious freedom.  A tolerant First Amendment is 
wary of the power of churches to oppress individuals and therefore insists that the 
First Amendment allows no “citizen [or church] to become a law unto himself.”126  
In other words, both churches and their members must obey the law.  
The courts, however, have frequently decided cases by a standard that 
tolerance abhors, namely one that protects institutional churches from legal 
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accountability to their members in the name of religious freedom.127  The Schubert 
case is a prime example.  The Schuberts sued the church, the senior pastor, the 
youth minister, and other members of the church for negligence, gross negligence, 
professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false 
imprisonment, assault, battery, loss of consortium, and child abuse.  After a first 
round of appeals,128 the so-called “religious” claims—gross negligence, 
professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of 
consortium—were dismissed and the “secular” ones—assault, battery, and false 
imprisonment—went to the jury, which awarded Laura $300,000 in compensatory 
damages plus $142,438.30 in prejudgment interest against the church defendants.129  
The Texas Supreme Court took away Laura’s verdict.130  Although Pleasant 
Glade Assembly of God had conceded in its first appeal that liability was 
appropriate for the “secular” torts, in its second appeal the church contested the 
jury’s verdict on First Amendment grounds.131  With some convoluted reasoning, 
the Court ruled the church was not estopped from challenging the verdict because it 
had really been arguing all along that it was liable for physical injury only.132  
Because Schubert’s case included testimony about emotional harm, the Court ruled, 
damages were not permitted under the First Amendment, even for false 
imprisonment.133  
Consider first the reasons given for barring the “religious” claims—
negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and loss of consortium.  The church convinced the appeals court 
that because the dispute with Schubert involved the “laying on of hands” it was 
purely theological and  
would involve a searching inquiry into Assembly of God beliefs and the validity of 
such beliefs, an inquiry that is barred by the First Amendment. . . . Regarding 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the First Amendment 
gives Pleasant Glade the right to engage in driving out demons—intangible or 
emotional harm cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of 
action against a church for religious practices.134 
The court employed the mix of arguments that recurs in tort lawsuits involving 
religious organizations, namely that there is no possible legal standard of care for 
religious professionals because identifying such a standard would involve the 
courts in doctrinal judgments that belong to the church.135  The Supreme Court of 
Texas majority believed that any discussion of exorcism would involve theological 
disputes about what an exorcism is, how it is properly performed, and whether the 
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Assembly of God performs exorcisms on its members or not.136 
Similar arguments have prevented other courts from recognizing a tort of 
clergy malpractice and have freed clergy of liability for inappropriate counseling of 
(i.e., sexual advances toward) married persons and minors.137  Such reasoning 
enables bad conduct by churches that tort law would otherwise penalize, a worry 
that was confirmed by the appeals court’s overbroad statement in Schubert that 
“[a]lthough the freedom to act is subject to regulation, this regulation only burdens 
purely secular activities that are nonreligious in motivation.”138  
The ruling on religious negligence allows a sick teenager who was faint, 
hungry, or hypoglycemic from a sleepless night with friends to be negligently 
treated by a religious group as long as they call it an exorcism.139  In a similar 
manner, parents are frequently not prosecuted for child abuse when they fail to 
provide their children with medical care for religious reasons.140 
The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling on the “secular” intentional torts—false 
imprisonment, assault, and battery—even more completely missed the mark.   The 
trial court was able to keep evidence about the church’s beliefs about exorcism out 
of the trial, and the jury was free under tort law to conclude that Laura had 
consented to her church members’ conduct and find no liability.141  Instead, the jury 
awarded her damages.  Nonetheless, the majority ruled that church and state would 
become too entangled if the courts attempted to assess Schubert’s emotional harm 
“because the religious practice of ‘laying hands’ and church beliefs about demons 
are so closely intertwined with Laura’s tort claim, assessing emotional damages 
against Pleasant Glade for engaging in these religious practices would 
unconstitutionally burden the church's right to free exercise and embroil this Court 
in an assessment of the propriety of those religious beliefs.”142 
A better rule, defended by the dissenting justices in Schubert, is that “‘under 
the cloak of religion, persons may [not], with impunity,’ commit intentional torts 
upon their religious adherents. . . . Unfortunately, this is precisely what the Court's 
holding allows.”143 The majority’s holding suggests that religious persons leave the 
law outside when they enter the church building, an intolerant standard not only for 
adults but especially for minors who have not consented to religious harm.  This 
“permits characterizing churches as utterly different from other societal institutions 
and thus marks churches as alien.”144  The majority’s standard does not even 
respect John Stuart Mill’s principle that behavior is legitimately limited when harm 
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to others occurs.  Religious tolerance should not require deference to the decisions 
of a church to harm its members.  
2. Property 
Deference to churches also predominates in intrareligious property disputes, 
which in the past few years have filled the courts as local Episcopal communities 
try to leave the national church because of disagreement over gay ordination while 
maintaining title to local property.  On this subject the courts’ odd deference to 
church hierarchies ignores toleration’s legitimate skepticism of church authority 
and its rule that churches, like secular organizations, must be subject to the law.   
Consider a hypothetical posed by Justice William Rehnquist in a 1976 church 
property case: 
Suppose the Holy Assembly . . . had a membership of 100; its rules provided that a 
bishop could be defrocked by a majority vote of any session at which a quorum 
was present, and also provided that a quorum was not to be less than 40.  Would a 
decision of the Holy Assembly attended by 30 members, 16 of whom voted to 
defrock [the bishop], be binding on civil courts . . . ?145 
Rehnquist said no, it would not, but he wrote those words in his dissent in Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich against the majority who overturned a 
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court supporting the defrocked bishop against the 
church’s hierarchy.146  Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion relied on the 
“church polity” rule that defers to the leadership of a hierarchical church: 
For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by 
civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical 
tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as 
binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity 
before them.147 
A different rule applies to congregational churches, which are treated like 
voluntary associations and held to majority rule and other fair procedures.148  To 
date, the Supreme Court has identified only two polities, hierarchical and 
congregational, and leaves it to judges to determine which church fits which 
model.149 
Justice Brennan added the following remarkable comment to his Serbian 
Orthodox ruling:  
[I]t is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are 
to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by 
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objective criteria.  Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular 
notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly 
relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.150  
Similar to the Schubert ruling, the remark suggests that individuals lose their 
legal rights when they walk through the church’s front door and that churches are 
“alien” institutions with standards unlike other American organizations.  “In a 
country that extols democracy, most citizens would find it permissible but curious 
if all members of hierarchical churches engaged in complete submission to 
authority,”151 and many members of hierarchical churches would be surprised to 
find that they had abandoned their legal rights when they joined the church.  
No wonder Justice Rehnquist objected to Brennan’s Serbian ruling and the 
hierarchical polity rule in colorful language: 
A casual reader of some of the passages in the Court's opinion could easily gain 
the impression that the State of Illinois had commenced a proceeding designed to 
brand Bishop Dionisije as a heretic, with appropriate pains and penalties.  But the 
state trial judge in the Circuit Court of Lake County was not the Bishop of 
Beauvais, trying Joan of Arc for heresy; the jurisdiction of his court was invoked 
by petitioners themselves, who sought an injunction establishing their control over 
property of the American-Canadian Diocese of the church located in Lake County.  
The jurisdiction of that court having been invoked for such a purpose by both 
petitioners and respondents, contesting claimants to Diocesan authority, it was 
entitled to ask if the real Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese would please 
stand up.152 
Rehnquist used the strong language of “arbitrary lawlessness,” “blind 
deference,” and “rubber-stamp” to condemn the hierarchical approach: 
If the civil courts are to be bound by any sheet of parchment bearing the 
ecclesiastical seal and purporting to be a decree of a church court, they can easily 
be converted into handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness. 
[. . . ] 
Such blind deference, however, is counseled neither by logic nor by the First 
Amendment.  To make available the coercive powers of civil courts to rubber-
stamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical religious associations, when such 
deference is not accorded similar acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in 
avoiding the free exercise problems petitioners envision, itself create far more 
serious problems under the Establishment Clause. 153 
Since 1979, when the Supreme Court identified the “neutral principle of law” 
approach to property disputes in Jones v. Wolf,154  
courts must choose between deferring to a group’s hierarchy or using neutral 
principles of law, that is, relying on documents that do not require choosing 
between controverted interpretations of doctrines or practices.  The basic stance is 
one of noninvolvement: government may not resolve internal problems by criteria 
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that have a religious character.  This basic stance reflects the limited competence 
of secular courts, and it serves the autonomy of religious organizations.155 
Because the Supreme Court has not decided a religious property case since 
1979, the state courts have been left to resolve the recent cases involving the 
Episcopal churches around the country, where many local congregations seek to 
leave the national diocese because of their disapproval of the national church’s 
support for gay ordination.156  
The cases have had different results. Eleven Virginia local church 
congregations who split from the Episcopal Church won their lawsuit when a 
Fairfax County judge ruled that Virginia law allowed them to depart from the 
church with their property.157  The law is a Civil War-era law unique to Virginia; it 
awards property ownership to the majority in the local church, even in a 
hierarchical church.158  The Episcopal Diocese plans to appeal on First Amendment 
grounds, arguing that the Virginia statute impinges on the freedom of churches to 
govern themselves.159  
In contrast, in California, the California Supreme Court found for the national 
church using the neutral principles of law standard: 
Although the deeds to the property have long been in the name of the local church, 
that church agreed from the beginning of its existence to be part of the greater 
church and to be bound by its governing documents.  These governing documents 
make clear that church property is held in trust for the general church and may be 
controlled by the local church only so long as that local church remains a part of 
the general church.  When it disaffiliated from the general church, the local church 
did not have the right to take the church property with it.160 
The court observed that in response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions, especially 
Jones v. Wolf, the Episcopal Church adopted Canon I.7.4, which recites an express 
trust in favor of the general church.161  The court rejected the local church’s 
argument that it had never expressly ratified this canon,162 explaining that 
“[r]equiring a particular method to change a church's constitution—such as 
requiring every parish in the country to ratify the change—would infringe on the 
free exercise rights of religious associations to govern themselves as they see fit.  It 
would impose a major, not a ‘minimal,’ burden on the church governance [in 
violation of Jones v. Wolf].”163 
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard agreed with the result 
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but questioned the use of the neutral principles of law approach because “[n]o 
principle of trust law exists that would allow the unilateral creation of a trust by the 
declaration of a nonowner of property that the owner of the property is holding it in 
trust for the nonowner.”164 Instead, she wrote, the polity approach allowed 
judgment on behalf of the hierarchical national church.165  
The breakaway local groups also lost in New York, which applied the neutral 
principles of law approach in favor of the national church.166  The Court of Appeals 
explained that in 1979—in response to Jones v. Wolf—the national church had 
adopted the Dennis Canons, which state that the real and personal property of the 
parishes is held in trust for the national church.167  Although the property deeds 
were unclear about ownership, the court relied on the church’s constitution as 
dispositive.168  
Such reliance on church documents as the final word has troubled some 
scholars, who have proposed that courts rely only on secular documents in making 
their judgments about property divisions.169  Although this would force the 
churches to prepare legal documents, it is a better alternative than automatically 
letting the courts rubber-stamp whatever hierarchical churches desire. 
Speaking of New York, its Religious Corporations Law includes separate 
articles for Protestant Episcopal Parishes or Churches, Apostolic Episcopal 
Parishes or Churches, the Holy Orthodox Church, the American Patriarchal 
Orthodox Church, Presbyterian Churches, Roman Catholic Churches, Christian 
Orthodox Catholic Churches of the Eastern Confession, Ruthenian Greek Catholic 
Churches, Churches of the Orthodox Church in America, Reformed Dutch, 
Reformed Presbyterian and Lutheran Churches, Baptist Churches, Churches of the 
United Church of Christ, Congregational Christian and Independent Churches, the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of America, and many more, including the 
Assemblies of God churches.170  Such state laws appear tolerant because they try to 
allow different denominations to pick the legal structure that is most consistent 
with its theology.  They run the risk, however, of letting churches become a law 
unto themselves and of undermining the common law enforcement necessary in the 
tolerant rule of law. 
A tolerant First Amendment embraces the words of Justice Rehnquist’s 
Serbian dissent: “The rule . . . is that the government may not displace the free 
religious choices of its citizens by placing its weight behind a particular religious 
belief, tenet, or sect.”171  It does that when it protects institutions instead of 
individuals, as it also does, not only in tort and property law, but also in 
employment law. 
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3. Employment  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of religion, race, color, sex, or national origin, contains an exemption for 
religious organizations from lawsuits for religious discrimination.172  The common 
sense of the exception is that Baptists may favor Baptists in their hiring just as 
Democratic groups favor Democrats and Planned Parenthood’s members are pro-
choice.  Congress considered but did not pass legislation that barred religious 
organizations from all lawsuits; therefore religious organizations can be sued for 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.  “Employment 
discrimination unconnected to religious belief, religious doctrine, or the internal 
regulations of a church is simply the exercise of intolerance, not the free exercise of 
religion that the Constitution protects.”173   
Because Title VII technically would allow women to sue churches that do not 
ordain women for sex discrimination, the courts have read a “ministerial exception” 
into the statute.174  The exception is supposed to serve the valid tolerant goals of 
keeping the state from interpreting religious dogma, intruding on church autonomy, 
and imposing clergy on the churches.175  In practice, however, the ministerial 
exception has extended far beyond that point and become a grant of immunity 
blocking lawsuits against churches and allowing them to become a law unto 
themselves.176  Despite the name of the exception, the cases have not been limited 
to ministers and priests.  Female or gay high school teachers, secretaries, university 
professors, organists, and choir directors, among others, have had their 
discrimination lawsuits dismissed because of the churches’ religious freedom to 
hire as they wish without court interference.177  In other words, antidiscrimination 
law is not the same for religious as it is for secular organizations. 
Consider the case of Lynette Petruska, who became the first female chaplain in 
Roman Catholic Gannon University’s history.178  Because of that all-male history, 
at the time of her appointment, Petruska asked if she would be replaced as soon as 
a male priest returned from Rome or another male candidate became available.179  
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She was assured that the job was hers to keep.180  Then the university president 
faced charges of sexual harassment, and Petruska served on the Sexual Harassment 
committee.181  As the controversy unfolded, Petruska alleged that “she opposed 
limiting the time frame during which a Gannon employee could file a sexual 
harassment grievance with the university; helped prepare a report criticizing the 
university’s sexual harassment policies; played a pivotal role in notifying [the 
provost and bishop that the president] had sexually harassed a Gannon employee 
for several years; and opposed [the bishop’s] decision to allow a former Gannon 
priest, who had been terminated for sexual misconduct toward students, to enter the 
university’s campus.”182 
In the second Third Circuit opinion about Petruska’s lawsuit, Judge Smith 
dismissed the Title VII lawsuit for gender discrimination and retaliation using a 
simple but misguided argument that, because the ministerial exception protects “a 
religious institution’s right to select who will perform particular spiritual 
functions,” Petruska’s lawsuit should be dimissed.183  That analysis missed the 
point, as was shown by the first Third Circuit opinion, written by Judge Becker 
with Smith in dissent, which was withdrawn because Judge Becker died as the 
opinion was circulating.184  Although a religious organization might fire someone 
for genuinely religious reasons (because she did not hold the proper faith or 
perform the ritual correctly), Judge Becker insisted that “a religious institution 
might also fire a woman because the individuals making the decision are, simply 
put, sexist.  Religious doctrine and internal church regulation play no role in such a 
decision.”185 According to Judge Becker, the facts of Petruska’s case involved the 
latter situation. Title VII prohibits such sex discrimination, and to give churches 
immunity for such suits protects churches at the expense of the civil rights of 
individuals.  
Gannon University believed that women could be chaplains. It offered no 
religious rationale for firing Petruska. Nonetheless, her Title VII claim was 
dismissed.  As Judge Becker wrote, “Employment discrimination unconnected to 
religious belief, religious doctrine, or the internal regulations of a church is simply 
the exercise of intolerance, not the free exercise of religion that the Constitution 
protects.”186  The churches’ exercise of intolerance is then magnified when courts 
protect churches’ power instead of individuals’ constitutional rights and exempt 
churches from the laws that govern everyone else.  A tolerant First Amendment 
must protect individuals against churches as well as against the lethal combination 
of church and state.  
Recent ministerial exception cases confirm that Petruska’s case is not unique.  
Although churches are not exempt from racial discrimination under the statutory 
language of Title VII, courts continue to dismiss racial discrimination cases without 
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even looking at the facts.187  In one case, a Methodist minister alleged racial 
discrimination against his superintendent as well as retaliation—blocking him from 
getting a new job—because he had complained about racial discrimination. The 
court barred both claims.188   
Age discrimination claims by teachers in religious schools are repeatedly 
dismissed although considerations of age bear no relationship to religious 
doctrine.189  Such rulings “effectively extend[] a free pass to religious schools to 
discriminate against their lay employees.”190  The free pass extends to disability 
rights as well.  Cheryl Perich taught kindergarten for five years at Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran School until she became “suddenly ill” and went on disability 
leave until her doctors diagnosed narcolepsy.191  Although Perich provided a 
doctor’s certification of her readiness to return to work, the school board repeatedly 
asked her to resign.192  When she challenged the denial of a teaching position, she 
was fired for her “insubordination and disruptive behavior.”193  The school board 
also observed that Perich’s threats of a disability lawsuit “damaged beyond repair” 
her working relationship with Hosanna-Tabor.194  Although the church made no 
claim that there were religious reasons to refuse to hire teachers suffering from 
narcolepsy, both her Americans with Disabilities Act and retaliation claims were 
dismissed.195  The ministerial exception placed the church above the law at the 
expense of church members. 
The success of religious plaintiffs’ employment claims is not guaranteed; like 
all employment discrimination plaintiffs, they should bear the burden of proof.  In 
contrast, the ministerial exception allows cases to be dismissed without any 
consideration of the facts or without any specific evidence that the religious 
employer’s free exercise was implicated in the employment decision.  Gannon 
University did not have a doctrine of sexual harassment, nor did Hosanna-Tabor 
espouse a religion of disability discrimination.  Nonetheless, the courts protected 
their freedom to discriminate for no religious reason.  As Judge Becker wrote, 
“Employment discrimination unconnected to religious belief, religious doctrine, or 
the internal regulations of a church is simply the exercise of intolerance, not the 
free exercise of religion that the Constitution protects.”196  As the Framers knew, 
individuals need to be protected from the powers of the church.  
These three examples from tort, property, and antidiscrimination law illustrate 
the problems with a vision of religious freedom that neglects it roots in toleration.  
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The Framers drafted the First Amendment in order to protect a constitutional right 
to religious freedom and to protect individuals from the powers of church and state.  
Instead, the Free Exercise Clause has been transformed into a standard that protects 
religious organizations from complying with the laws at the expense of their 
members.  Recognizing the dangers of religious wars among churches that seek to 
impose their own truth, tolerance establishes a system of the same law for 
everyone.  Instead, the courts have offered religious organizations special 
protections from the law’s application. 
That problem is exacerbated when government funding helps religious 
organizations to attain their goals at the expense of individual freedom, as 
described in Part IV-B.  
B. GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF RELIGION 
Q. Mr. Lyons, what did IFI teach as to what you needed to do to get off drugs and 
stay off drugs? 
A. Drug addiction was recognized as a sin. And all we had to do was seek—
confess that sin, repent of that sin, and just start doing things differently from that 
point forward. 
Q. And what did IFI teach the cure for substance abuse problem was? 
A. Well, I would say it was—again, if you’ve confessed your sin and you have—
you were forgiven, then you were no longer bound by that sin, so therefore you 
could go ahead and move on.  You were freed from that addiction.  You were 
released from that addiction.197 
IFI is the InnerChange Freedom Initiative, a Christian prison ministry founded 
by Watergate convict Charles Colson, which teaches that prisoners’ lives can be 
healed by becoming Christian: “If these felons never want to wind up behind bars 
again, they are told, they must accept the ‘life-transforming power of Jesus 
Christ.’”198  In this “Bible boot camp,” prisoners spend sixteen-hour days in 
classes, in an environment of prayer, Bible reading, and hymn singing, all with the 
goal of that “inner change” that gives the program its name.199  
The questions and answers quoted above were testimony in a lawsuit against 
the Iowa Department of Corrections, which sponsored an InnerChange program in 
its state prisons.  Other prisoners’ comments about the program are equally 
illuminating.  One Catholic prisoner used his own Catholic Bible for the Bible 
workshop but found out that it did not provide him with the “correct” answers.  
When he told Bruce, the IFI staff member, that he wanted to use the program to 
learn more about Catholicism, the IFI staff member revealed Bruce saying “that’s 
not what they was going to be teaching, and their program consisted of a seven-
day, 24-hour a day type religion, still not letting me know exactly what kind of 
religion they was going to be teaching, but was letting me know, basically, mine 
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was taking a second seat to what they was going to teach.”200  
A federal district court ruled that the state sponsorship of the program violated 
the Establishment Clause.201  The prison experience illustrates the numerous 
constitutional questions about the increased government support for faith-based 
organizations [FBOs] that began during the Clinton administration, grew during 
George W. Bush’s presidency, and is now backed by President Obama.202  
Although the government aid programs claim to support equality, neutrality, and 
free exercise, many of the programs are not tolerant.203  A tolerant First 
Amendment insists that the government may not fund religious practice or foster 
discrimination against individuals.  Unfortunately, even under President Obama, 
the federal government has not yet made the commitment to such tolerance for all 
religions.  
Debates about government aid to religion are as old as the nation.  When the 
citizens of the fledgling American republic worried that public morality was 
declining in colonial Virginia, they proposed an assessments bill to fund 
churches.204  A tax to fund teachers of religion would be imposed on every citizen, 
each of whom would then choose which Christian denomination should receive the 
money.205  A list of the citizens’ churches of choice would be maintained in the 
courthouse.206  The churches could choose to spend the money either on building 
places of worship or paying ministers’ salaries.207  An exception was made for the 
Quakers and the Mennonites, who had neither buildings nor clergy, and were 
therefore allowed to use their money as they saw fit.208  Money from taxpayers who 
did not belong to a church would go to the local schools.209   
A prominent opponent of the legislation wrote the following words of 
criticism:  
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in 
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular 
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?  That the same authority which 
can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of 
any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all 
cases whatsoever?210 
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Those are the famous words of James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments, which was written in 1784 in opposition to Patrick 
Henry’s Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion.211  
Madison, with the help of Virginia’s Baptists and other dissenters, won the 
argument, and instead of the assessments bill, the State of Virginia passed Thomas 
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which stated that no one could 
be compelled to “support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.”212  
Memorial and Remonstrance provided numerous arguments against Henry’s 
bill, including one that mentions intolerance and draws an analogy between the bill 
and the Spanish Inquisition.213  According to Madison: 
the legislation degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions 
in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.  Distant as it may be 
in its present form from the Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree.  The one 
is the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance.  The magnanimous 
sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions, must view the Bill as a 
Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek some other haven, where liberty and 
philanthrophy in their due extent, may offer a more certain repose from his 
Troubles.214 
Memorial and Remonstrance reminds us that the status of government funding 
of religious organizations has been a vexing problem since the nation’s origins.  
The Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion 
demonstrates that sometimes the government is tempted to promote morality by 
supporting religion.  The Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom215 
suggests there is a venerable American tradition of believing that the liberty of the 
individual conscience is best protected when individuals are not compelled to 
support religion and may freely choose their own worship.    
In the 20th century, many religious groups argued that the rise of the welfare 
state, where the government funds everything, requires a different perspective on 
funding religion than that taken by Madison.216  They believe free exercise, equal 
protection, and neutrality require the funding of religion.  That argument is 
overstated.  A tolerant First Amendment does not allow the government to fund 
religious teaching, which is the goal of programs like InnerChange.  Tolerance sees 
through the free exercise argument that churches have a right to public funding as 
well as the equal protection and neutrality arguments that churches must receive 
equal funding to other social services providers.  Instead, the history of tolerance 
teaches that church and state must not join forces to influence individual liberty of 
conscience by, for example, proposing the Bible as a cure to alcohol addiction.  
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Providing government aid to institutions that are allowed to discriminate in 
hiring,217 moreover, is not tolerant.  Just as the Wars of Religion taught that 
religious truth should not be the basis of the laws, so too the government should 
never fund religious truth; a tolerant First Amendment allows religions to pursue 
the truth without government funding and supports the non-religious programs that 
they offer under the same conditions as secular providers.  
Religion-based social services organizations like Catholic Charities, Lutheran 
Social Services, the Salvation Army, and the Jewish Federation have received 
government funding for many years.218  In 1996, for example, Catholic Charities, 
the largest such organization, received $1.3 billion in government aid.219  These 
groups, however, are the separately-incorporated, secular affiliates of the churches 
and synagogues.  Catholic Charities, for example, is a separate legal entity from its 
sponsor, the Roman Catholic Church.220  The provision of government aid to the 
secular affiliates, and not to the churches themselves, was consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s long tradition of church-state no-aid separation, which did not 
allow the states to fund religious practices or “pervasively sectarian” institutions.221  
In August 1996, Congress passed welfare reform legislation that included a 
“charitable choice” amendment introduced by Missouri Senator John Ashcroft.222  
Ashcroft, the son of a Pentecostal minister, was influenced by Marvin Olasky’s 
writings about the success of religious groups in solving social ills.223  Although the 
primary focus of the welfare legislation was on state involvement and the 
privatization of welfare, Senator Ashcroft quietly and successfully included the 
charitable choice amendment, whose purpose was to make the states’ contracts 
available to religious organizations without any compromise of their religious 
identity.224  
Then-Texas Governor George W. Bush, who successfully stopped drinking 
after he was born again to Christian faith, was ahead of the federal Charitable 
Choice movement; three months earlier, he had founded an FBO task force.  Bush 
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was also one of the first governors to welcome InnerChange to state prisons.225  
Like Governor Bush and other advocates of FBOs, Senator Ashcroft believed that 
directing government aid to secular affiliates undermined the churches’ religious 
identity and discriminated against churches that did not want to create the separate 
organizations.226  Ashcroft’s goal was to get the money to the churches themselves 
without compromise of religious identity.227 
The argument and the Charitable Choice amendment’s language came from 
University of Missouri Professor Carl Esbeck, whose research made two 
substantive points that are important for understanding President Bush’s faith-
based reforms.  First, Esbeck believed that faith-based organizations should be able 
to receive funding without employing the secular affiliate status employed by many 
religious social agencies, i.e., by keeping their religious identities without any 
dilution.228  Second, Esbeck argued that the old system discriminated against 
religious in favor of secular providers, especially by requiring religions to 
secularize in order to receive aid.229  Accordingly, the legislation allowed churches 
to receive contracts, vouchers or other forms of funding:  
[O]n the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without impairing the 
religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing the religious 
freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded under such program.230 
Government funds could not be used for “sectarian worship, instruction, or 
proselytization.”231  Religious providers did not have to remove religious art and 
symbols from their buildings or dismiss religious personnel from their governing 
boards.232  The religious groups retained their exemption from civil rights statutes 
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion in hiring,233  but were forbidden 
to discriminate against aid recipients on the basis of religion.234  Secular 
alternatives had to be available to the recipients, although the law did not require 
notification to beneficiaries of those alternatives.235  Finally, the religious groups 
were allowed to keep the contract money in a separate account so that the rest of 
their finances would not be audited.236  
As noted above, in 1996 the primary focus of government officials was on 
welfare reform and not charitable choice, and President Clinton’s administration 
did little to implement the legislation.  Indeed, one important book on FBO 
suggests that some Democrats voted for the amendment because they were sure 
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Clinton would never enforce it.237  President Bush was a different story.  He 
sponsored FBO legislation from his first days in the White House.238  After the 
failure of all his proposed congressional FBO bills, George Bush enacted his entire 
FBO policy by executive order.239  
Bush’s FBO legislation failed because it included provisions allowing religious 
employers to hire and fire employees based on religious beliefs.240  House 
Democrats, led by Representatives Bobby Scott of Virginia and Chet Edwards of 
Texas, focused on this issue of employment discrimination and rallied opposition to 
expanded charitable choice on that basis.241  As we learned in Part IV-A(2), Title 
VII, the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s, which prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, contains 
an exemption for religious organizations from the ban on religious 
discrimination.242  That exemption makes a certain intuitive sense; it permits 
Baptist organizations to hire Baptists, Catholic groups to hire Catholics, and so 
forth, just as environmental groups employ pro-environmental workers and Planned 
Parenthood’s counselors are pro-choice.243  The religious hiring point is usually 
made most forcefully about the ministry: surely, the argument goes, the Catholic 
Church may “discriminate” by hiring Catholics, and only Catholics, to be priests, 
and Baptist ministers must be Baptist.244  
Many churches refuse to hire women and gays even though Title VII prohibits 
gender discrimination and some state and local antidiscrimination laws protect 
sexual orientation.  As a technical matter of statutory interpretation, those churches 
should be subject to suit for gender and sexual orientation discrimination in these 
circumstances because their exemption is for religious discrimination only.  But, as 
we saw in Part IV, the ministerial exception keeps the cases from getting into 
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court.245   In other words, antidiscrimination law is not the same for religious as it is 
for secular organizations. 
Concerns about discrimination thwarted Bush’s FBO legislation in Congress.  
The exemption of religious employers from religious discrimination laws sounds 
straightforward and reasonable at first glance, as rabbis should be Jewish, imams 
Muslim, and so forth.  Allowing churches to hire their own ministers is part of the 
appropriate church autonomy recognized in Part IV-A. 
The FBO context, however, raises a different set of issues.  Jewish taxpayers’ 
money, for example, might go to organizations that refuse to hire Jews, wish to 
convert Jews, or whose theology casts Jews as the murderers of Jesus Christ.246  
Churches that disapprove of homosexuality or women’s equality could fire gay 
workers or refuse to hire “unmarried pregnant women,”247 while receiving 
government funds.  In 2001 and 2002, the Democrats hammered away at the 
discrimination theme, insisting that the Republican House bill gave federal funds to 
groups that violated the antidiscrimination laws.  Their point was reinforced in July 
2001, when the Washington Post broke a story that the Salvation Army had 
promised to support the FBO initiative in return for a pledge from Bush political 
adviser Karl Rove that the organization would be exempt from state and local 
antidiscrimination laws, specifically any laws requiring the organization, which 
opposes gay rights, to be subject to domestic partnership laws.248  
Thus, in the funding of FBOs reappear the intolerance issues of Part III, where 
religious groups used Proposition 8 to enact their religious opposition to 
homosexuality into law and now wish to use government funds to support that 
intolerance.249  In the FBO context, such tolerance becomes intolerant as religious 
groups expect taxpayers’ money to fund their religious truth.  
Senator Obama seemed to understand this point during the presidential 
campaign.  “Obama clearly singled out the policy during a campaign speech in 
July, declaring that ‘if you get a federal grant, you can’t use that grant money to 
proselytize to the people you help and you can’t discriminate against them—or 
against the people you hire—on the basis of their religion.’”250  When President 
Obama announced the opening of his White House Office of Faith-based and 
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Neighborhood Partnerships, however, he left the Bush hiring policies in place.251  
Robert Scott, the Virginia representative who had blocked Bush’s FBO legislation 
because it allowed for discrimination in hiring, stated, “‘Based on what he said, we 
thought the issue had been resolved, . . . You’ll have to ask them why they think it's 
all right to discriminate.’ . . .  [T]he issue carried ‘racial implications’ because 
‘most churches are either 100% white or 100% black. . . . If you allow religious 
discrimination, then racial discrimination is essentially unenforceable[.]’”252 
Meanwhile, religious leaders were happy with Obama’s decision.  
As the prison testimony suggests, discrimination in hiring is not the only 
difficult issue surrounding government aid to FBOs.  If religious programs believe 
that faith solves social problems like alcoholism or drug addiction, then the 
government is funding faith whenever it aids those providers, a combination of 
church and state that promotes intolerance and undermines individual religious 
liberty.  When the government promotes the Protestant Bible over the Catholic 
Bible in state prisons, it has forgotten the tolerant roots of the First Amendment.  
Empirical studies about FBOs demonstrate that government funding is less likely to 
wind up in the pockets of smaller religious groups—a reminder of the last point 
about tolerance, that it is more equipped to welcome new religions and 
philosophies to the American climate than current free exercise and establishment 
jurisprudence.  
V. TOLERANCE ACCEPTS THE NEW DIVERSITY 
The Summum religion is based on seven principles: psychokinesis, 
correspondence, vibration, opposition, rhythm, cause and effect, and gender.253  
Summum, which was founded in Utah in 1975 and describes itself as a form of 
Gnostic Christianity, teaches that God originally gave Moses the Seven 
Aphorisms.254  After the Israelites were unprepared to receive the aphorisms, 
however, Moses destroyed those first tablets and later replaced them with a second 
set of tablets containing the simpler Ten Commandments.255  The Supreme Court 
recently refused Summum’s request to place a Seven Aphorisms monument in a 
Utah park that already contained a Ten Commandments display.256  The result 
reflects the current intolerance of the Court’s public displays jurisprudence toward 
minority religions. 
To date, the Supreme Court’s intolerant First Amendment jurisprudence has 
allowed Christian monuments—crosses and Ten Commandments—to remain in 
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public settings while requests for equal space by minority religions like Summum 
and Buddhism are denied.  This result is intolerant because the state’s power is 
used to enforce and favor one religious truth—Protestant Christianity—over 
others.257  A tolerant First Amendment imposes two requirements that the Court 
has ignored: first, it recognizes that crosses and the Ten Commandments retain 
their religious character and are not secular; second, it allows such religious 
displays to stand only if they are surrounded by other religious monuments and 
symbols, such as, the Summum Aphorisms, the Buddhist stupa, the Jewish Star of 
David, the Muslim crescent and star, or the Wiccan pentacle.   
Instead, the Court has employed a “tyranny of labels”258—free speech, public 
forum, nonpublic forum, government and private speech, establishment—to rule 
against the minority religions, and in doing so has neglected the tolerant core of the 
First Amendment.  This intolerance is most evident in the four most recent 
Supreme Court cases about displays, not only Summum, but also the two Ten 
Commandments cases, as well as a California case, recently granted certiorari, 
about a Latin cross and a Buddhist shrine or stupa.259 
Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah, contains a Ten Commandments 
monument donated to the city in 1971 by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.260  
Summum offered a Seven Aphorisms monument to the park, but the city rejected it 
on the grounds that, unlike the other monuments in the park, Summum’s display 
either did not relate to the history of Pleasant Grove or was not donated by a group 
with “long-standing ties” to the city that had made “valuable civic contributions to 
our city for many years”261—presumably a reference to the Eagles.  Summum 
reasonably challenged those two post hoc justifications for the denial because the 
Ten Commandments monument was quite distinctive compared to the other Utah-
based monuments in the park: 
• Old Bell School (oldest known school building in Utah) 
• First City Hall (original Pleasant Grove Town Hall) 
• Pioneer Winter Corral (historic winter sheepfold) 
• First Fire Station (facade of city’s first fire station with plaque) 
• Nauvoo Temple Stone (artifact from Mormon Temple in Nauvoo, Illinois) 
• Pioneer Log Cabin (replica, built in 1930) 
• Pioneer Water Well (donated by Lions Club in 1946) 
• Pioneer Granary (built in 1874, donated by Nelson family) 
• Ten Commandments Monument (donated by Fraternal Order of Eagles in 
1971) 
• September 11 Monument (project of local Boy Scouts) 
• Pioneer Flour Mill Stone (used in first flour mill in town, donated by Joe 
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Davis).262 
Summum challenged the denial on First Amendment speech grounds.  
Following the terminology of free speech jurisprudence, the district court originally 
ruled for the city because the park was a nonpublic forum in which the government 
could control the content of its own message.263  The Tenth Circuit, however, ruled 
for Summum on the grounds that the park was a traditional public forum that the 
government had opened to private speakers, where the government may not 
discriminate on the basis of the monument’s content.264  In the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the parties debated whether the monuments in the park were government or 
private speech.265  If the former, the government has the freedom under First 
Amendment law to control its own message.  If the latter, the government is not 
permitted to discriminate when it opens a forum for private speakers.  
With the focus on speech, not religion, the city’s lawyers identified the drastic 
implications of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Summum that the park was a public 
forum: “If the authorities place a statue of Ulysses S. Grant in the park, the First 
Amendment does not require them also to install a statue of Robert E. Lee.”266   “In 
short, accepting a Statue of Liberty does not compel a government to accept a 
Statue of Tyranny.”267  Judge Michael McConnell, who dissented from the Tenth 
Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, lamented: 
This means that Central Park in New York, which contains the privately donated 
Alice in Wonderland statue, must now allow other persons to erect Summum’s 
“Seven Aphorisms,” or whatever else they choose (short of offending a policy that 
narrowly serves a “compelling” governmental interest).  Every park in the country 
that has accepted a VFW memorial is now a public forum for the erection of 
permanent fixed monuments; they must either remove the war memorials or brace 
themselves for an influx of clutter. . . . A city that accepted the donation of a statue 
honoring a local hero could be forced, under the panel’s rulings, to allow a local 
religious society to erect a Ten Commandments monument—or for that matter, a 
cross, a nativity scene, a statue of Zeus, or a Confederate flag.268 
Despite its religious facts and the case’s implications for establishment and 
free exercise, Summum was not litigated under the Religion Clauses.  At the oral 
argument, even the Supreme Court justices appeared confused that the case was 
about free speech, not religion; Justice Anthony Kennedy derided the “tyranny of 
labels” that left the Court speaking about nonpublic and public fora, government 
and private speech,269 and the Chief Justice warned the city that “the more you say 
that the monument is Government speech to get out of the first, free speech—the 
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Free Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you’re walking into a trap under the 
Establishment Clause.”270  
When the Court issued its unanimous ruling for the city, however, the labeling 
was straightforward; Justice Samuel Alito concluded “although a park is a 
traditional public forum for speeches and other transitory expressive acts, the 
display of a permanent monument in a public park is not a form of expression to 
which forum analysis applies.”271  In other words, the government cannot ban 
Summum’s members from reading the Seven Aphorisms aloud in the park while 
allowing other private speakers to read the Ten Commandments, but the 
government may choose one monument over another because the government 
speaks through the monument. 
Although the Court’s ruling appears practical and unsurprising—would the 
justices dare authorize the Statues of Tyranny and Zeus?—in effect the Court 
protected the Protestant Ten Commandments at the expense of other religions.  
Earlier precedents did not help Summum; the Supreme Court’s and Tenth Circuit’s 
case law made it nearly impossible to litigate Summum’s challenge on religious 
grounds.  The Court has decided numerous cases allowing public religious displays 
containing crèches, menorahs, and the Ten Commandments.  In Lynch v. 
Donnelly,272 Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote that the public display of a crèche 
in a holiday display that also included “a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling 
Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures 
representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of 
colored lights, [and] a large banner that reads ‘SEASONS GREETINGS’” did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.273  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence introduced 
her influential endorsement test, which asked whether a reasonable observer would 
believe the government endorsed religion in the display.274  Endorsement “sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
favored members of the political community.”275  
In a later crèche case,276 Justice O’Connor concurred in a decision that a 
Christian Nativity scene on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County 
Courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, but an eighteen-foot Chanukah 
menorah or candelabrum, located outside the City-County Building and next to the 
city’s 45-foot decorated Christmas tree and a “salute to liberty” sign, did not.277  
O’Connor again relied upon the endorsement standard, concluding that the crèche 
conveyed a message of exclusion to non-Christians, while the combined display of 
menorah and Christmas tree did not send a message of endorsement of Judaism or 
Christianity.278  O’Connor’s solution, which was widely criticized, suggested that 
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the best way to cure a possible Establishment Clause problem is to surround 
authentically religious symbols with as many secular symbols as possible, 
including teddy bears, clowns, and elephants.279  
In Lynch, the dissenting Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) 
correctly and tolerantly objected to the majority’s depiction of the nativity scene as 
a secular, holiday symbol, insisting on the “clear religious import of the crèche” 
and “its inherent religious significance.”280  Tolerance recognizes religion as 
religion and does not attempt to secularize it.  This religious–secular distinction had 
legal significance in Tenth Circuit history as well; in 1973 the Court ruled in 
Anderson v. Salt Lake City that a Ten Commandments monument at a county 
courthouse was secular, not religious.281  That precedent kept Summum’s potential 
claim of religious discrimination from being litigated; if the commandments were 
secular, the Utah cities could not violate the Establishment Clause by allowing the 
Ten Commandments but not the Seven Aphorisms.  In subsequent litigation against 
the City of Ogden, Utah, Summum conceded in 2002 that it could not win an 
Establishment Clause challenge to another Ten Commandments display without an 
en banc reconsideration of Anderson, and it placed its hopes on free speech.282  
Then in 2005 the Supreme Court decided two conflicting Ten Commandments 
cases.  In McCreary County v. ACLU, Justice David Souter’s opinion invalidated a 
display of the commandments in a Kentucky county courthouse because it lacked a 
secular purpose.283  In contrast, in Van Orden v. Perry,284 Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist wrote that “the nature of the monument and [] our Nation’s history” 
allow Texas to display a Ten Commandments monument on state capitol grounds 
in a park that also includes”: 
Heroes of the Alamo, Hood’s Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Fireman, 
Terry’s Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy, Spanish-American War, Texas National 
Guard, Ten Commandments, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer 
Woman, The Boy Scouts’ Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans, 
Korean War Veterans, Soldiers of World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas 
Peace Officers.285  
Justice Antonin Scalia pushed further, arguing that the First Amendment 
allows the government to prefer monotheism and to erect such monuments, and 
noting with approval that 97.7 percent of the population believes in the Ten 
Commandments.286  Justice John Paul Stevens sparred with Justice Scalia over the 
nature of the commandments, trying to teach him “[t]here are many distinctive 
versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different 
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denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these 
differences may be of enormous religious significance. . . . In choosing to display 
this version of the Commandments, Texas tells the observer that the State supports 
this side of the doctrinal religious debate.”287  Scalia intolerantly rejected Stevens’s 
reasoning with the rejoinder: “The sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not 
widely known.  I doubt that most religious adherents are even aware that there are 
competing versions with doctrinal consequences (I certainly was not).  In any 
event, the context of the display here could not conceivably cause the viewer to 
believe that the government was taking sides in a doctrinal controversy.”288  But the 
Court took sides in a religious controversy; the appropriate text of the Ten 
Commandments has been widely contested in Jewish and Christian history, and it 
is only Protestant versions of the commandments that have been upheld in the 
Supreme Court.  Justice Scalia also seemed unaware that “nonreligion” is now 
gaining more adherents than the traditional religious faiths.289 
Because of Justice O’Connor’s influential endorsement test and her usual role 
as swing voter in Religion Clauses cases, Court observers were surprised when 
Justice Stephen Breyer, not O’Connor, became the swing voter who maintained the 
Texas Ten Commandments monument.  Alone among the Justices, Breyer 
mentioned tolerance at the beginning of his analysis; because there is no “simple 
and clear” test of the Religion Clauses, he wrote:  
One must refer instead to the basic purposes of those Clauses. They seek to 
“assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all.” . . . .  
They seek to avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social 
conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike.290 
Those sentences were consistent with Breyer’s general theory of constitutional 
interpretation, which looks to the purpose of the constitutional text in order to 
resolve difficult questions.291  
Breyer also wrote that context mattered in this “borderline” case; within the 
setting of the Texas capitol, surrounded by monuments about Texas history, he 
found the Ten Commandments were more secular than religious, more concerned 
with moral edification than religious indoctrination, a conclusion supported (in his 
opinion) by their uncontested presence on state grounds for forty years.292  As a 
final point, Breyer worried about the cost of removing the monuments from the 
park because a holding against the state “might well encourage disputes concerning 
the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public 
buildings across the Nation.  And it could thereby create the very kind of 
religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”293  In 
other words, the removal of longstanding religious monuments was intolerant in 
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Justice Breyer’s eyes, even if the monuments were no longer very religious.  
Breyer’s Establishment Clause analysis replicated the Free Exercise Clause 
mistake diagnosed in the earlier section of this essay about gay marriage, where 
free exercise improperly offered an excuse to impose one religion through force of 
law rather than to be tolerant of all religions.  Contradicting the core of the 
Establishment Clause, Breyer’s analysis allowed the Court to favor one majority 
religion that has been here longer than others—Protestant Christianity—in the 
name of tolerance. Despite recognizing the proper purpose of the First 
Amendment—tolerance for all—Justice Breyer, like Justice Scalia, privileged 
traditional religion. Breyer’s flawed analysis confirms Professor Kurland’s point 
that the Framers understood that establishment—the separation of church and 
state—was necessary to protect toleration.  Without separation, in the name of 
tolerance the majority religion will always be preferred.      
Justice Breyer’s opinion seemed to offer constitutional protection to Eagles 
Ten Commandments monuments around the country, and it sounded the death knell 
for the Society of Separationists’ challenge to the Ten Commandments monument 
in Pleasant Grove City.294  If Van Orden precluded the Establishment Clause 
challenges, then Summum was left with free speech only, and it brought that issue 
to the Court, where the justices remain undecided about the interaction of free 
speech and establishment.  
Although Summum was litigated as a free speech and not an establishment 
case, the justices acknowledged during oral argument and in the opinion that 
establishment lurked in the background.  Justice Scalia preemptively announced 
that Summum could not win a future Establishment Clause challenge, warning 
litigants and encouraging cities that there was no Establishment Clause violation in 
Pioneer Park because it was “virtually identical” to the display in Austin, Texas: 
The city ought not fear that today’s victory has propelled it from the Free Speech 
Clause frying pan into the Establishment Clause fire.  Contrary to respondent’s 
intimations, there are very good reasons to be confident that the park displays do 
not violate any part of the First Amendment. . . .  
The city can safely exhale.  Its residents and visitors can now return to enjoying 
Pioneer Park’s wishing well, its historic granary—and, yes, even its Ten 
Commandments monument—without fear that they are complicit in an 
establishment of religion.295 
This strong conclusion on an unbriefed issue was consistent with Scalia’s argument 
in the Ten Commandments cases that the government may prefer religion over 
irreligion, and monotheism to polytheism: “With respect to public acknowledgment 
of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the 
Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in 
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unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”296 
The other justices were not so conclusory about the Establishment Clause. 
Justice Alito mentioned the Clause in his opinion for the Court.297 Justices Stevens 
and Ginsburg suggested it would apply in future cases and warned against allowing 
the new government speech doctrine to undermine establishment restrictions.298  
Oddly enough, Justice Breyer failed to mention the Establishment Clause, not even 
responding to Justice Scalia’s conclusion that the Utah problem was “virtually 
identical” to the Texas monument spared by Breyer in Van Orden.299  Justice 
Souter, who was usually an ardent proponent of the separation of church and state, 
addressed the establishment issue in the most detail, musing over the unanswered 
questions about the interaction of “government speech doctrine” and religion that 
Summum engendered:  
The case shows that it may not be easy to work out.  After today’s decision, 
whenever a government maintains a monument it will presumably be understood 
to be engaging in government speech.  If the monument has some religious 
character, the specter of violating the Establishment Clause will behoove it to take 
care to avoid the appearance of a flat-out establishment of religion, in the sense of 
the government’s adoption of the tenets expressed or symbolized.  In such an 
instance, there will be safety in numbers, and it will be in the interest of a careful 
government to accept other monuments to stand nearby, to dilute the appearance 
of adopting whatever particular religious position the single example alone might 
stand for.  As mementos and testimonials pile up, however, the chatter may well 
make it less intuitively obvious that the government is speaking in its own right 
simply by maintaining the monuments.  
If a case like that occurred, as suspicion grew that some of the permanent 
displays were not government speech at all (or at least had an equally private 
character associated with private donors), a further Establishment Clause 
prohibition would surface, the bar against preferring some religious speakers over 
others. . . . But the government could well argue, as a development of government 
speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own views, it is free of the 
Establishment Clause’s stricture against discriminating among religious sects or 
groups.  Under this view of the relationship between the two doctrines, it would be 
easy for a government to favor some private religious speakers over others by its 
choice of monuments to accept.300 
Justice Souter accurately identified the difficult problems that the Court’s 
opinions have created; indeed Summum shows that cities already find ways “to 
favor some private religious speakers over others by its choice of monuments to 
accept.”301  The monuments accepted and protected are Christian and the rest are 
not.  
A tolerant First Amendment responds to Justice Souter’s concerns by 
recognizing that religious symbols retain their religious identity in any setting and 
that existing symbols may continue to stand only if they are surrounded by other 
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religious symbols.  Unlike the endorsement theory, which secularizes religious 
symbols by surrounding them with teddy bears and balloons, tolerance 
commonsensically recognizes that religious symbols are religious.  The Ten 
Commandments are religious in nature, as are the Seven Aphorisms, as befits their 
source in God’s gift to human beings.  Unlike the Scalia monotheism theory, which 
allows the government to promote the religion of the Founders and of the 
majority,302 toleration does not allow any one religion—or any one version of a 
religion—to be recognized as true, as occurs when Protestant translations of the 
Ten Commandments fill the public square.  Unlike the Breyer borderline tolerance 
theory, which worries about possible intolerance toward the majority religion and 
religion in general,303 a tolerant First Amendment requires attention to all religions, 
and should require new religious monuments to balance the old.  
Consider as a model the City of Mission Viejo, California, which added a 
Muslim holiday display to an intersection that already contained Jewish and 
Christian decorations.  The following year officials at first cancelled the display 
because so many religious groups wanted to participate, but later found a park large 
enough to accommodate displays from the ten to fifteen groups that applied to 
mount their own distinctive religious symbols.304  The tolerant approach, of either 
removing official religious symbols or surrounding them with other religious 
symbols, could help the government to avoid the disingenuous arguments of 
Pleasant Grove City and Austin, who insisted that the Ten Commandments related 
to Utah and Texas history the same way that Pioneer Winter Corral, Pioneer Log 
Cabin, Pioneer Water Well, Pioneer Granary, Pioneer Flour Mill Stone, Pioneer 
Woman, and Heroes of the Alamo did.  
Frank Buono, the plaintiff in the California cross case now before the U.S. 
Supreme Court,305 appears to be a tolerant man.  As a Roman Catholic, Buono does 
not find the cross offensive; it is the core of his own religion.  Instead, he filed a 
lawsuit because he was “personally confronted with, and offended by, the 
government’s favoritism of the cross over other symbols, religious or otherwise, 
and he sues to redress his own offense.”306 
Salazar v. Buono involves a Latin cross originally erected in 1934 (and 
replaced several times over the years) on Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National 
Preserve in San Bernardino County, California, by the Veterans of Foreign Wars as 
part of a war memorial.  The cross now sits on federal land.  The federal district 
court and the Ninth Circuit repeatedly ruled that because the cross is indisputably a 
religious symbol—it represents Christianity and no other religion—it violates the 
Establishment Clause and therefore must be removed.307  
After the courts’ rulings of unconstitutionality, the National Park Service 
[NPS] made plans to remove the cross, until Congress made several efforts to stop 
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the Service’s actions.  First, Congress blocked NPS from funding the removal of 
the cross.308  Then Congress passed legislation trading the land under the cross to 
the Veterans of Foreign War in exchange for other VFW property.309  This transfer 
of religious symbols from public to private land is not unique; in another Summum 
case, the City of Duchesne twice transferred a Ten Commandments monument to 
private hands to avoid the request to display the Seven Aphorisms.310  During that 
same time period, “NPS received a request from an individual seeking to build a 
‘stupa’ (a dome-shaped Buddhist shrine) on a rock outcropping at a trailhead 
located near the cross.  NPS denied that request, citing the Code of Federal 
Regulations as prohibiting the installation of a memorial without authorization.311  
A hand-written note on the denial letter warns that ‘[a]ny attempt to erect a stupa 
will be in violation of Federal Law and subject you to citation and/or arrest.’”312  
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the question whether the 
establishment violation can be avoided by transferring the property from 
governmental to private hands.313  The Solicitor General has defended Congress’s 
actions along the Breyer thesis; it is intolerant to remove the cross.314  As in the Ten 
Commandments cases, the government’s creative energy has gone entirely to 
finding a way to preserve Christian symbols rather than to worry about the 
exclusion of groups like the Buddhists or the offense to Catholics like Buono.315  
Like Summum, Buono threatens to succumb to the “tyranny of labels” as the 
Court once again debates what is private and what is governmental without looking 
at the underlying religious issues.316  If the government can transfer and therefore 
relabel its monuments as private speech, it can avoid the Establishment Clause and 
keep the country populated with religious monuments—of one religion. 
Another labeling issue threatens Frank Buono, the plaintiff in the California 
case, as the government contends he lacks standing to bring the case because “he 
has no objection to the public display of a cross, but instead is offended that the 
public land on which the cross is located is not also an open forum on which other 
persons might display other symbols.”317 
The philosophical father of tolerance, John Locke, questioned extending 
toleration to Catholics (because their allegiance to the Pope made them dangerous 
to the state) and atheists (because “[p]romises, covenants, and oaths, which are the 
bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist”).318  It is also doubtful 
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that the Founding Fathers desired to protect atheists.319  But the tolerance of the 
U.S. Constitution extends far beyond Locke’s and the Framer’s limits.  Although 
the principle remains the same, it must be applied to new facts and circumstances.  
“[T]he intolerance of late 18th-century Americans towards Catholics, Jews, 
Moslems [sic], and atheists cannot be the basis of interpreting the Establishment 
Clause today,”320 explained Justice Harry Blackmun in his opinion for the Court in 
Allegheny County, the crèche and menorah case: 
Precisely because of the religious diversity that is our national heritage, the 
Founders added to the Constitution a Bill of Rights, the very first words of which 
declare: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .”  Perhaps in the early days of the 
Republic these words were understood to protect only the diversity within 
Christianity, but today they are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and 
equality to “the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as 
Islam or Judaism.”  It is settled law that no government official in this Nation may 
violate these fundamental constitutional rights regarding matters of conscience.321  
The jurisprudence of public displays, unfortunately, does not match Justice 
Blackmun’s words, as the influential Catholic Justice Scalia’s analysis tells 
Summum that the courts do not have to tolerate atheists, or polytheists, or even, 
apparently, Gnostic Christianity.322  In the public displays area, the Court still 
intolerantly promotes one true version of one true religion.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
As in the Framers’ era, today the religious pluralism of the United States 
makes it impossible to identify a shared religion that all citizens can reasonably be 
expected to endorse.  As the intense debates about gay marriage described in Part 
III confirmed, attempts to establish government according to religious principles 
are divisive, a modern American form of the European Wars of Religion.  No 
religious or philosophical principle can resolve the controversies of a pluralist 
society.  Instead, today as in the 18th century, the best option is a legal and political 
order based on constitutional tolerance.  
The need for toleration arises in situations of pluralism, where citizens 
disagree about essential truths. Citizens have a choice.  They can insist that their 
compatriots accept “the truth” and live according to it, or they can agree to disagree 
about religious and philosophical truths and take the time to build a stable political 
order built upon tolerance.  
The principle of toleration has normative bite.  In this essay, I identified three 
claims about toleration that are missing from current First Amendment law and 
politics. First, because toleration is a political and legal principle, toleration is 
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skeptical about religious truth claims and accordingly denies the state the power to 
enforce religious truth through force or law. Second, tolerance protects the 
individual against the power of both church and state. Third, toleration must extend 
beyond the diversity among Christian sects of old Europe and the young United 
States and stretch in directions not anticipated by the Framers. 
Following these standards modifies current law and politics. Under the 
principle of tolerance, contentious issues like gay marriage are resolved according 
to constitutional principles of liberty and equality rather than religious norms of 
Christian love.  Churches and religious organizations are held to neutral laws of 
general applicability and not allowed special privileges to harm their members. 
Government funding of religion is not permitted.  Public Christian displays are 
supplemented with the signs and symbols of other religions and philosophies.  The 
end result is less intolerant religion and more religious liberty.  
